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The United States of America, through Congress; is trying 
very hard to establish a principl e which, after all, is the 
great principle of American liberty, the principle which !'eally, 
more than any other, is representative of a democratic form of 
Government. It. is embodied in a popular song of a hundred years 
ago: 
"Give to me the land where all inherit liberty to 
rise by honest merit. 0 
We think that if there is an honest opportunity for am.an 
to grow and sell his tobacco leaf without restraint, if there 
is an honest market in which the pr.::>ducts of tobaceo may be 
sold, that there will be  an opportttnit;y for the man, gro-wing 
and selling, to rise by honest merit and for the dealer, by 
honest merit, to advance in his business; and perhaps for some 
little man, with only a f ew hundred dollars but with ingenuity 
and zeal and energy, to work in some back shop somewhere, manu­
facturing cigarettes or other tobacco products, and compete with 
the largest companies in the world and, finally, reach that high 
point of eminence. that has been reached by sueh men a.a Henry 
Ford and a number o! others. 1 
With this impassioned oratory the Government opened its case 
against the major tobacco companies in 1941. For the companies this was 
no new experience. In some ways it was different., but in reality the 
tobacco industry ha.d been on trial since the 1 890•s. The companies had 
b een tried and found guilty by the Government, by farmers, and by the 
The American Tobacco Company et al. vs. Uni ted States of America, 
U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals for theSiith Circuit, Vol. VIII, p. 585$. 
2 
economic literature of several decades. The accusations had varied, but 
always included was the charge that they were guilty of exploiting the 
tobacco farmer by depressing the prices of the product on which he de­
pended for his living. 
A recent writer has said, 11 0ne would think., from the volume of 
protest over the years ., that the principal use of market power in this 
industry has been to drive down the prices of leaf tobacco." 2 
Glenn Johnson, prominent agricultural economist., has remarked: 
The belief was prominent among tobacco people at this time 
(1933) that tobacco manufacturers had been taking ttun:fairn 
advantage of producers. Rowe quotes figures to the effect. 
that between 1923 and 1932 returns to farmers for domesti­
cally manufactured tobacco decreased from 174 million 
dollars to 68 ndllion dollars while manufacturers• profits 
increased from 76 to 146 million dollars. From the very 
beginning {of farm price support programs), tobacco pro­
ducers were given special attention among producers of 
different farm products. 3 
From almost every major work on the tobacco industry could be 
drawn quotations to describe the sentiment which has prevailed during 
this century among the tobacco growers concerning the tobacco companies. 
How strong the feeling has been at times is indicated by the actual out­
break of physical violence in the major growing areas. Perhaps even 
stronger evidence of underlying suspicion and distrust is furnished by 
2 
Richard B. Tennant, The American Cigarette Industry (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1950)-;--p. 316. 
3Glenn L. Johnson, Burlel Tobacco Control Programs (Kentu.eky Agri­
cultural Experiment Station, University of Kentucky, Lexington, Bulletin 
SBO., Februar
y 1952), p. 7. 
3 
the elaborate precautions hich have bee taken in recent years to assure 
a 1toompetitive" market a.t the tobacco auctions. �o one farm.liar with 
tobacco gro dng or its manufacture ould deny that the i'armer is still 
convinced that the buyers could and would exploit him in the absence of 
strong preventive measures. 
The Problem 
A casual inspection of data on prices, production, and income for 
tobacco growers indieates that, on balance, they me.y have been in an 
historically favorable position. It will be of interest to investigate 
the situation of the tobacco farmers relative to that of the growers of 
other commodities, particularly to determine 11 hether the peculiar con­
ditions of competition in the tobacco industry may not have redounded to 
the benefit of the grower of the raw· product. 
Such a study can best be approached by computing over time, for 
tobacco and other agricultural products, the "terms of exchange» suggested 
by Theodore Schultz and the 11Ames Sehool. " There are certcrln limitations 
upon conclusions which can be drawn from such an anal.ysis. One must keep 
in mind that this paper has not as its purpose the measurement of ex­
ploitation of tobacco growers. It is rather concerned wit.h the relative 
priee position of tobacco as a commodity and with the relative position 
of tobacco growers, whether_!� they� subjected ,:!:2. exploitation. 
The theoretieal analysis and the evidence presented at trial.a and 
hearings concerned with tobacco companies indicate ·that there may be some 
exploi t.ation of tobacco gro11ers. The evidence of exploitation can be 
set down rather easily along with some generalizations about the serious 
social implications. It seems impossible., how-ever, for reas ns to be 
shown, to measure the preeise amount of exploitation. 
Importance of the Study 
This study is significant in that it helps to sharpen the issues 
in a controversy which has had and will continue to have far-reaching 
implications in our ti.me and in time to come . We shall be ore and more 
concerned with industry size and its implications in the future, and all 
paths which see to hold promise must be investigated. 
In the past wr· ters who have dealt with the leaf-buying phase of 
the tobacco industry have tanded to co centrate their attention upon an 
investigation of the monopsonistic exploitation which, unfortunately, is 
not measurable . Thero has been much investigation because this industry 
is the almost perfect example of the oligopoly-oligopsony market structure. 
Yet one is left to face the fact that m. ' le much has been done, there is 
much to do. 
The tobacco grower has been imbued lfith the notion 'that he suffers 
unjustly, and that in some way the ia.rge tobacco companies are res1,,onsibl.e 
for his suffering. Circumstantial evldence points in this direction. 
The tob ... eco grower 1Y-ould be confounded to discover that the prices of his 
crop have held u:p over time much better than the prices of other farm 
products and that perhaps he must look elsewhere than to the tobaecn 
companies for a scapegoat for his co pltinta . 
This, then, is the importance of th.is study. It is n attempt 
to view an old problem vrith a new light. 
Related Studies 
, 
There are no studies which have a direct relation to this one, in 
the sense that no attempt has been made to measure the relative position 
of tobacco .tamers and other farmers . 4 There are certain writers in the 
fiel who are r.ell known and wit,h w ose worlr.s one must be familiar in 
order to dete nine the amount and nature of previous investigation. 
These -works have served as background raaterial for parts of this study 
and as t .e point of de arture for the heart of the study. 
:Xtensi ve work in the general area. has been done by �lliam H. 
Nicholls. His Imper.:'ect Co petition ' ithin AgricuJ.tu.ra.l Ind.ustries5 
is accepted as the guidebook for t.liose who are interested in economic 
4
1t might b e  well to state here that no attem � will be made to 
cli.fferentiate between tobacco farmers as such and other types of far.mars 
as such . To do so would necessitate the choice of some arbitrary igure 
( number of pounds or bushels of a product raised or the amount of land 
devoted to a certain product) for differentiating purposes . In both the 
literature and in agricultural statistics writers seem to use the terms 
"tobacco far.mer" and "tobacco grower:, synonymously. No one seems to 
have decided who is a. tobacco .fartner. Our problem, ho1rever, is one of 
relative commodity pri0es and relative farm income from particular com­
modities .  
'William H. Nicholls, Imperfect Competition Within A£icultural 
lndustries ( Iowa : The Iowa State College Press, 1 9415 . 
6 
analysis and economic theory as it is concerned with agricultural indus­
tries . After lay:lng out this theoretical framework, Nicholls turned t o  
the specific ease of the tobacco industry and wrote Price Policies In � 
Ci�arette Indust!:1:.6 This book is in the nature of an historical study 
which brings together in one volume many of the facts and figures essential 
to an expert knowledge of the industry. He attempts no theoretical analy­
sis and offers no prescriptions . It is, one presumes, left to the reader ' s  
discretion to attempt to fit this industry into Nicholls ' previous theo­
retical framework. 
Among other writers in the field are Meyer Jacobstein, Reavis Cox, 
Richard B. Tennant, Ross Robertson, Nannie Tilley, T .  J. Woofter, Jr., 
and Warren c. Baum, all of whose writings will be referred to later. 
Sources of Data and -ethods of Procedure 
T ,e literature mentioned in the .foregoing section has been investi­
gated along ith all available articles in perlodi.eals touching upon the 
subject. The voluminous court records of the 19 41 Te>bacco Case have been 
studied as have been other Government hearings , notably those of the 
Federal Trade Commission. Because the method of procedure involves large 
amounts of statistical data, the various issues of Acyieultural Statistics 
William H. Nicholls , Prlee Policies JE � Ci§arette Industry 
( -ashville, '. ennessee: The Vanderbilt University Press, 1951}. 
published by the Department of Agricul·t 1r have figured pro:ninently in 
the study. 
7 
The problem and the method of approach used has been discussed 
wit� farmers, wa:cehous emen, :representatives of tobacco ompa.nies and th.Gt 
Department of Agriculture, and economists in an attempt to gain a clear 
and broad insight into the study. 
'rhe use of the nterm.s-of-exchange 11 concept for comparative analysis 
has been facilitated by Theodore Schultz ' s  Agriculture In An Unstea21 
Econo:!!l. 7 The coneept underlying the terms of exchange procedure in this 
analysis involves the de-termination o th relationship between the prices 
of the products which the farmer has to sell and the prices of the pro­
ducts which he must buy. In order ·t;o have comparable figures,  -the clata 
must first be trans ated into index numbers . Indices which are used must 
be compiled -with the same year or years as their base period. The agri­
cultural indices published by the Government have been based on the 
average of the 1910-1 91 4  prices or the average of the August 1909 - July 
1914 prices .  The. industry indices are ·aighted indices cov ering various 
industrial products. - For the purposes of this paper agricultural indices 
have been compiled from agricultural statistics where it was desirable to 
use a base period for which indices 7era unavailable. 
After the indices are computed, the ratio between the index of 
prices which the f arr.u.er received .md the p ices v ich he paid is computed. 
7 
Theodore w. Schultz, Agriculture � �  Unsteagy Econornz (New Yo:rk: 
McGraw-Hill, 19hS) . 
8 
. bas. year is selected, and the ratio of t.1-ie "prices rece ved11 · n.dex t,o 
the «prices . a:idn index is set equal to 100 as th� 'terms of exchange 
index for the ba.se year. '!'he selection of the base y ar must be, in a 
sense, arbitrary. Any attempt to select a 11norme1 1' y-ear as the base 
must he frust :l'.'ated by the difficulty of defining "normalcy. n ru.stori­
cally significant points in time have been chosen. 
Thus, the terms of exchange show the change · n  purchasing power 
of th farmer' s  product as measured fro· a �elected y�a:r. General 
agricultural terms of exchange and specific terms for individual crops 
nave been computed for the p-urp�se of co :parat.i w analysis. 
Organization of. the Study by Chapters 
T:ie present chapter is devoted to a broad -..tat ment of the problem 
of the stucrJ and to rel tin · the problem to published sources of inf orma­
tion. CI apter II cont.a.ins an his'l:.orical sketch o the tobacco inc.u.stry 
which is included for the sake of ala�ity and a comprehe 1siv, vievqJoint .  
A certa...n t eoretical background is essential for the un erstanding of 
this problem. The necessary analytical material is present ed in Chapter 
III which is concerned with a brief .statement of the theory of exploi ta.­
tion and 'With a fairly detailed sketch of the theory of oligopsony and 
oligopoly. In this chapter the tobacco industry is fitted into the 
theoretical fra.>nework. The comparative analyses for which the early part 
of the st udy is background material are contained in Chapter IV. Chapter 
V is devoted to a surrunary statement and a statement of the author 's 
eonel.usi ons. 
CHAPTER II 
THE P.IS'l'ORY OF THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY 
The story of tobacco has held a fascination for countless writers; 
historians and romanticists have capitalized on the gold leaf as subject 
matter to an al.most greater extent than economists . It is impossible 
here to trace the tobacco industry from the days of its incipiency. 
Attention must be toeused on the years for Vfhich there are acceptable 
price data-and these begin with the 18 901s. 
Here we shall survey briefly the development of the tobacco 
industry--as it has been viewed by writers in the field --as background 
material for the price analysis presented in a later chapter. 1•his 
chapter will be meaningful to the reader to the extent  to which he cor­
relates it with the later section on price analysis. 
l The Trust, 18 90- 1910 
The original American Tobacco Company was formed in 18 90 as the 
result of the consolidation of five companies: Allen and Ginter; w. 
Duke, Sons and Co.lllpaey; Kinney Tobacco Company; Goodwin & Company; and 
W. s .  Kimball & Company. At the time of the consolidation these companies 
1
unless otherwise stated, the early industry background in this 
section is taken from Ross M. Robertson 's  "Monopsony and .Monopsonistic 
Markets" (Unpublished .M. A. thesis, Department of Economics, University­
of Kansas, 193 9). 
10 
controlled over 9 0  per cent of the cigarette production in the United 
States and competed strongly in the purchase of leaf tobacco and the 
distribution of cigarettes. 
Between February, 1891, and October, 1898, fifteen tobacco 
concerns doing business in eight states were acquired. In 1898 the Conti­
nental Tobacco Company was organized by the Amerierui Tobacco Company to 
control the plug tobacco business, and shortly thereafter Continental 
gained control of P. Lorillard Company. In 1898 the American Tobacco 
Company was manufacturing 86 per cent of the cigarettes in the United 
States. In 189 9 Continental acquired the Ligge_tt and Myers Tobacco 
Company and in the same transaction American gained control of the Union 
Tob a.eco Company. In 190 0 the American Snuff Company was organized and 
in 1 901 the American Cigar Company was formed. Thus the American Tobacco 
Company had gained a relatively firm hold on the distribution of all 
tobacco products. 
In 190 1 the American Tobacco Company and the Continental Tobacco 
Company created the Consolidated Tobaooo Company, a holding company which 
acquired practically all of the comm.on stock of the two companies .  The 
American, continental, and Consolidated Tobacco Companies merged in 19 04 
to form the American Tobacco Compaey of New Jersey. Table I shows the 
growth of control and extent of control which the American Tobacco 
Company acquired from 189 0  through 19 10. 
























PERCEN'l'AGE OF TOTAL U. S. PRODUCTION IN EACH BRANCH OF THE 
INDUSTRY CONTROLLED BY THE AMERICAN TOBACCO COMPANY8 
Fine Little 
Plug Smoking Cut Snuff Cigarettes Cigars 
7 . 9  
2 . 7  18. 0 3 . 3  3 .6  88.9  
3. 5 21. 9 4.1 4.0 87.9  
5 .9  21.7 4. 7 4. 7 85 .3 
5 .6 20.6 4. 3 3 .4 86.5  
12 . 4  2 2., 4. 3  .'.'h9 67.3 
20.0  20. 7 4.5 S .6 83. 4 
20.9 22.7 4.6 4. 8 8 0. 0  
2 3. 0  26.9  6.o 6.1 88. ) 48 .7 
56. J  54. 3  48 .5 32. 4  94. 7 54. 7 
62. 0  59 . 2  50. 5  78. 0 92. 7  6o.6 
67. 7  57.8 48. l  80. 2 88.9  73. 3 
71.2  66.3  73.7 a5. 9  84.6  71. 8 
76.9 67 .1 77.6 89. 4  83.9 57 .9 
78. 2  69 . 2  80 . 4  90. 6  87. 7  79 . 2  
80. 7 68. 7 81. 7 9).8  84. 7 78.3  
81. 8 70. 6  80. 9  96. 0  82.5 81.3 
80. 5  72 .4  81. 4  95. 7 81. 7 90.8  
81.0 73 .6 79.6 95. 7 81. 8  88 . 7  
83 . 3 75. 3  8 0.1 96 .1  83 .6 89 .0 
84. 9  76. 2  79 . 7  96.5 86.l  91. 4 
11 
Cigaz:s 
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M. R. Thompson, Trust Dissolution (Boston: 1919) ,  P •  115. Source : 
The table is compiled from the Report of the Commissioner of Corporations 
on Tobacco Industry, Part III, PP• 49, 84, 127, 1.30, 153, 181, 192.  
12 
This monopolistic position was sec.ured by improper methods of 
competition among which may be mentioned frequent reconsolida­
tions for the purpose of centralizing control in the hands of  
a few and to hide the results obtained; res�rictive covenants 
with competitors whose interests had been acquired ;  restrictive 
contracts with jobbers and dealers by which only the combination ' s  
goods could be  handled; acquisition of stores and factories and 
their operation as independents; ruinous price cutting and trade 
t'lars waged \d th fighting brands, sometimes sold below oest; 
division of territory both at home and abroad; monopolization 
oi raw materials, especially licorice root; extended loans and 
credits to retail dealers ; acquisition of stocks, trade-mark,, 
patents and other essential elements of  tobacco manufacture. 
In 1907 the Government filed a bill to dissolve the company, and 
the decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals in 1908 was appealed to the 
Supreme Court by both sides. In Uay, 19 1, the , upreme Court handed 
down its deeision and the cause was remanded to the Circui� Court to work 
out so.me r1J0t.hod of  dissolution in accordanee with the law. On November 
16, 19ll, a decree was entered iiiihereby the American Tobacco Company was 
divided into fou teen successor eompanies3 which were to take over the 
property a."ld business of the defendants in the case. 'The defendants were 
enjoined from merging or .from entering into any agreements what.soever re­
garding the control of t.he successor companies or  regarding the purchase 
2 
M. R. Thompson., Trust Dissolution ( Bt>st,on : 1919)., pp. 115-1 16. 
3 . ... American To..,acco Company, Liggett &. }zyers Tobacco Compa.i;.y, P., 
Lorillard Company, American Snuff' Cou1,pa.ny; J., s. Young Company, George 
W. Helnle Company, 'l'he Johnston Tin Foil & Metal Company, Weyman-Bruton 
Company, R.. J.  Reynolds Tobacco Company, :British -American Tobacco Company, 
Ltd • ., United Cigar Stores Company, Porto Rican-American Tobacco Company, 
The Conley Foil Company, Mac-Andrews and Forbes Company. 
13 
and sale of tobacco and its products. None of the corporat ions could 
hold the stock of another, and i t  waa required that the business of each 
company be carried on under its o,m corporate name for a period of five 
years. The fourteen companies could not have interlocking direeto;rates 
and were enjoined from employing c�:nmon agents +..o purchase tob cco leaf'. 4 
Because of th_ limited information available pertaining to the 
subject, the evidenc ... of th buysr ' s  control in the raw tobacco market 
during this first period of the modern industry has not been considered 
in d-etail by , riters . Robertson said, however, nThe writer is convinced 
that here is t he best example of monopsony on a large scale th at can be 
found. "' 
Meyer Jacobste · n, an early ,1ri ter on the subject o f  the to acco 
industry, stated that " .  • • discontent and u.>1rest among southern grcmers 
have their origin in the unduo advantage possessed by the Tobacco Trust 
in purchasing its leaf . u6 He discussed the failure of the auction system 
as a method to secure competition in ths pm-chase of leaf tobacco, and 
b lamed t is failure on the fact that 11 • • •  the buyers agree t� pool their 
interests and depress prices by curtailing the veey- competition which the 
4Federal Trade Commission, Report � �  Tobacco Industg, 192 0, 
P• 1$ 5. 
Robert.son, �· cit. , p .  69. 
6 
Meyer Jaeobstein, "The  Tobacco Industry in the United States," 
Stu.dies- in Hi.story, Economics, and Public Law, Vol. XXVI (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 19 07>,p . 36 . -
warehouse market sought to invite. n 7 He continued, 
Such accusations are, of course, difficult to substantiate. 
One fact, however, becomes more and more obvious, namely, 
that in proportion as the Trust has extended its power over 
tbe market, prices of leaf have fallen • • • • • Despite 
all denials to the contrary, the blame for the price de­
pression has been placed §Y planters , with unanimous accord, 
at the door of the trust. 
14 
The story of the farmer 1 s attempts to better his position during 
the years of the Trust has been tra.ced effeeti vely by sev eral writers in 
the field.9 It is only neces5ary to point out here that st1ah attempts 
were unsuccessful. 
There a e sufficient data. available to substantiate the claims 
that tobacco farmers were in a relatively poor position price-wise 
7 
�-, P• 75° 
8
Toid., PP• 75-77 . 
9
see John G. Miller, The Black Patch War (Chapel Hill: 'rhe 
University of North Carolina. Press, 1936). Rob rtson quot.e Anna 
Youngman ' s statement in "The Tobacco Pools of Kentucky and Tennessee, 11 
found in a 191 0  issue of the Journal � Political Econogy·. 11 • • •  (it) 
is true that the influence of a trust over prices can in no case be  
properly gauged if investigation be confined solely to the amounts 
charged for the finished product offered to customers. Potency in 
dictating th sums to be paid for the raw mate · als w:.ed in ma.nu.f aeture 
is frequently of far greater significance. It may be no part of the 
policy of the trust to ant.a onize the public at larg and to diminish 
sales by putting up the prices of its standardized products. It may 
coneei vably be much more ro i table to exercise its pow r s bey er 
rather than as seller to increase the margin betvireen the prices of the 
crude material and of the manufactured article. Cer ainly the American 
Tobacco Company has not advanced the price of the plug tobacco, cigars, 
&nd cigarettes which it markets so extensively; and without doubt the 
price of leaf tobacco has fallen. But it is questionable whether the 
trust can be re arded as entirely responsible for ·that fall. 0 
during the years in which the Trust was opera�ing effectively. These 
data are presented in Chapter IV. 
The Post -Dissolution Years 
1$ 
Professor Reavis Cox has said that in order to appraise the 
policies of the successor companies in the years between 1910 a:nd 1930, 
one must remember that the conditions which they faced were shaped to a 
large extent by factors over which they had no control. He traces the 
effect on the tobacco industry of World War I, the increase in popula­
tion, the increased concentration of consumer demand on cigarettes and 
the mechanization of cigar manu.facture .10 
The 1 92 01 s saw an almost phenomenal growth in the demand for 
tobacco products. Between the years of 1910 and 1930, the consumption 
of leaf tobacco in this country increased from 550, 82 0, 0 00 to 78J, 98l,OOO 
pounds, an increase of about 42 • .3 per cent. The cigarette production in 
1910 was eight and a half billion and in 1930 over one hundre d twenty -
five billion. This was an increase of something over 1,5 00 per cent.11 
'!'he first World War had a great effect on the tastes of American smokers. 
The difficulty of obtaining the Near Eastern tobaccos led to a substitution 
of domestic blends . This factor combined with population increases and 
York : 
10 
Reavis Cox, Competition !£ the American Tobacco Industr;r: ( New 
Columbia University Press, 1933), pp. 4 0-$ 9. 
11 
�-, PP• 41-4 4. 
16 
the breaking down of the prejudice against cigarette smoking (which was 
effected through an all-out advertising campaign waged by the tobacco 
companies and directed toward women as well as men) started the cigarette 
industry on its way to being the giant industry it is today. 
When Cox turns to an analysis of competition in the purchase of 
leaf tobacco, he says: 
� • •  the more conspicuous successors of the American Tobacco 
Co, have prospered phenomenally since the disintegration. 
Tobacco growers, on the contrary, have suf fered severely. In 
part, no doubt, their woes are attributable to the general 
agricultural depression which started in 192 0; but there is 
evidence that tobacco producers I incomes have held below those 
of growers of other crops . Thus the incomes of growers of 
cigarette leaf, who should have prospered if any tobacco 
farmer did, have been estimated as averaging from one-half to 
two-thirds those of other farmers even in good years . Con­
fronted with such conditions, tobacco gI'Qwers would be more 
or less than human if they failed to see in the contrast 
conclusive evidence of a purchase monopoly exerting its 
power to enslave and exploit them.12 
Cox attempts to prove the existence of a purchase monopoly during 
post-partition days. He first tries a theoretical analysis whieh neces­
sitates the determination of what a monopoly price would be and con­
cludes that this approach is impossible. The empirical analysis of 
competition or collusion in tobacco leaf purchases offered by Cox has 
been improved upon very little by subsequent writers in the field. Cox 
says, 
We shall find that it is impossible either to prove or 
to disprove that monopoly has been an important force in 
12Ibid .,  P• 14].. 
reducing large numbers of tobacco farmers to the level of 
b are subsistence; but we shall also find that there are a 
great ,any- forces other than monopoly contributing to this 
result .13 
17 
It might b e  well to review briefly these factors as presented by 
cox. They are applicable, with modifications, to the entire poet­
dissolution period and through the present time . There ,vas, first, no 
production control during the years between 1 910 and 1 93 0, and farmers 
quite definitely disproved the theory that eaoh man working toward his 
individual goal will work for the common good. ) · th surplus production 
came low prices. Second, the institutional pattern of tobacco fanning 
was also conducive to trouble for t..he individual grower. Tobacco is a 
product particularly well - suited to the tenancy system and thus suffered 
from the usual ills of that system. Third, the fanners • difficulties 
may have been (and may be) due in part to the faults of the leaf tobacco 
marketing system. The auction system may allow for ease of collusion, 
and the confusion attending sales and the speed with which they are con­
ducted makes it virtually impossible for the tobacco grower to be an 
intelligent and informed seller. Fourth, because exports played an 
important part in the forlu."'1.ea of tobacco growers , it is evident that 
condi�ions affecting world trade were of vast importance to the growers. 
Finally, Cox mentions the fact that there was little product substituta­
bility available to tobacco growers-they were unable, b ecause of 
13 
Ibid., P•  147 . -
18 
distinctive soil and climate requirements, to shift to other types of 
tobacco in the event of changes in demand. 14 This factor was of impor­
tance to growers who were unable to raise cigarette tobacco when consumer 
demand shifted to and centered upon cigarettes to the virtual exc.lusion 
of other tobacco products. Having discussed and summarized these factors, 
Oox concludes., "Chronic widespread distress becomes almost inevitable,. 
purchase monopoly or no purchase monopoly. nl5 
Cox concludes his analysis of leaf prices with the following 
statement: 
The major conclusions to be drawn • • • •  a.re that .for the period 
under review as a. whole monopoly prices, while they probably 
would have been slightly lower than competitive prices, would 
not have differed very greatly from these competitive prices, 
the influence of dynamic forces being strong enough to prevent 
their settlir1g all the way to the short-period monopoly level; 
that in the absenee of such dynamic forces prices would probably 
go below competitive levels; that many forces other than monop­
oly account for the woes of large numbers of tobacco f anrers 
during the last decade; that there is no reason to quarrel with 
the Federal Trade Commission 's  conclusion that evidence of cel­
lnsion to . control pricgs and wreck the cooperatives in 1 920 was 
inconclusive • • • • •  1 
Certain sections of Cox I a material have been dealt with rather 
fully because they present clearly the picture of the post -dissolution 
years in tho tobacco industry. However, there are other writers in the 
�id. , PP • 148-160. 
l.5lbid. , P• 160 . -
16 
Ibid., PP • 1 85- 186. -
field -who ha.ve handled this material and this period with :f'inesse. Of 
part.ieular interest is 'l'. J. Woofter, Jr. • s  book, � Pli�ht � 
Ci,garette Tobacco • 17 Woofter had a flair for dramatic phraseology and 
at times seemed inclined to become overwhelmed with the emotional im­
pact of his mm writing, If Woofter ' s book ob tained any circulation 
among tobacco farmers, it is easy to see why they complained loud and 
long in the 19301 s. He said: 
The tobacco farmers today a.re pQe>r, disgruntled., and resent­
ful. Their incomes are among the lowest farm incomes in 
the country • • • • • On the other hand., the tobacco manu­
facturers are among the most prosperous concerns in the 
country • • • • •  18 Thus, to deal with hundreds of thou.sands 
of poorly organized, poorly informed far.mers, there ue £our 
highly organized and powerful domestic tobacco companies 
with a tremendous su.i-plus supply of the commodity on hand 
and with profits piling up, because of monopoly advantages, 
diminishing c0sts, and a demand which shows a tendency to 
keep climbing regardless of minor price fluctuations. Under 
these circumstances, the "big fourtt have piled up enormous 
profits and have been able to exert great influence not 
only on the retail price of their product, but also on the 
farm price of leaf tobacco .. 19 
After examining the situation carefully, Woofter concludes, 
19 
" ·  • • If the producers of cigarette tobacco are to eseape the conditions 
of a sweated industry developing rural slums, these difficulties must be 
surmounted by resolute action • • • • • u20 
17T. J. Woofter; Jr. , � Plight of Cigarette Tobacco ( Chapel Hill, 
North Carolina, 193 1) . 
18 Ibid., p. 4. --
lj 
Ibid., PP• 40-41. 
2 0Ibid. , p .  88. 
20 
At the instigation of the tobacco growers, the Federal Trade 
Commission made three reports to Congress in 1 920; 1 92 2, and 1925
21 
concerning the competitive situation in the tobaeco indu stry. The 1920 
Report � �  Tobacco Industry ea.me in response to a Congressional resolu­
tion which requested the Federal Trade Commission to investigate t,he 
decline in tobacco prices during the years 1919 and 1920, to ascertain 
the causes of the decline, and to inquire into the faets relating to 
possible violation of the a.�ti-trust acts. Complaints had been made to 
members of Congress by growers of Kentucky, Ohio, and ·rennessee regarding 
the low prices; charges ·were made by the growers that the buyers for 
large companies would not bid against each other and that there was 
organized effort on the part of the large tobacco interests to beat 
down the price of tobacco. 
The Commission advanced seven reasons for the decline in tobacco 
prices t excessive produ�tion of low -grade tobaccos ,  adverse foreign 
exchange rates, general financial instability in the United States, the 
dominant position of large companies, the use of common buying agencies, 
"holding off11 the market and buying nu.nder cover 11 by large interests, and 
collusion among buyers. 2 It will be impossible to discuss fully these 
21 
Federal Trade Commission, Report � �  Tobacco Industry, 192 0; 
Prices of Tobacco Products, 1922; The American Tobacco Company � The 
Imperial-Tobaeco Companz, 192 5. -
22 Federal Trade Commission, Report � �  Tobacco Industry, 192 0, 
PP• 34, 38, 48, 51, 53, 58, 144. 
21 
reasons .for price declines as advanced by the Federal Trade Commission . 
'the charge of collusion was not substanti ated. by the ev-idenoe. Ware­
housemen and independent dealers were guestioned at length, and it was 
found that there was a. diff erenee of opinion among individuals. The 
most, important. evidence of collusion adduced had to do ·with apparent 
harmony amt1mg buyers of large concerns and with apparent careful ef'f orts 
of some companies to buy fixed percentages of offerings on cert.ain markets. 
The Commission eoncl.uded that V'fu.ile the evidence was not conclus.i ve it 
indicated a very close relationship between some of the large manu­
facturer� and dealers. Since the companies involved were such important 
buyers it was felt that the evidence should be given considerable weight. 
The Commission ' s  final conclusion in the 1920 Report was that eight of 
the successor companies had violated the spirit of the dissolution decree. 
In the 1922 report ·the Commission stated that there had been no 
changes regarding eompeti ti ve eondi ticms in the buying of tobaeeo leaf, 
and it renewed its recommendations for modification of .the deeree. 2.3 
The 19 2$ report on the American Toba�co Company and the Imperial Tobaceo 
Company contained the information that the successor companies dominated 
the leaf markets as always, but that Ainerican and Imperial had eeased to 
use common buying agencies since 1920. 
It. is evident that in the tw decades tollo,ring the dissolution 
of the American Tobacco Company, tobacco farmers were still dissatisfied 
23Federal 'frade. Commission, Prices of Tobacco Pr0ducts. 192 2. 
. - --- ____ , 
22 
�1th the priees they were receiving for their produ�t. Having f und a 
scapegoat for their eom.pl.aints , they were not to be placated easily. 
Through the years when the complete economic system of the United States 
was reeling under the impact of the Ore t Depression, toba,cco farmers 
were blaming their hard luek on th0 Big 'l'hree.  2 4 
Previous to this, however, tobacco farmers had again decided to 
take matters into their ovm hands and had joined in the wave of cooper­
ative marketing which was sweeping the country in tl1e early 1920 ' s .  The 
movement failed so far as tob eeo cooperatives were concerned, however, 
and it would s-eem that the cooperatives were ever strong enough to affect 
prieee appreciably. 
The Period of Government Aid to Agriculture 
In May of 193 3 the Agricultural Adjustment Act was passed . The 
Act signified the beginning of a new era for agriculture, for it sym­
bolized the dawning of the recognition that specific steps were necessary 
to alleviate the distress which was prevalent in agriculture as a whole. 
The general purpose of the Act was to control agricultural production in 
order to raise prices through a reduction of supply. An acreage all.ot -
ment plan was used for basic crops (of which tobacco was one ), the allotment 
24
The term used to designate tbe American Tobacco Company, R. J. 
Reynolds Tobacco Company, and Liggett & !(reirs Tobaeco Company. 
2) 
for indi vi du.al farmers to be based on their crop history for a previous 
period • .  Plus the indirect benefit of' higher prices, the farmer was to 
receive direct benefi t payments for acreage reductions , Such payments 
were to be financed by a proeessing tax whicli in the case of tobacco 
would be paid by tobacco manufacturers . 
'l'he tobacco program was in reality six programs , the distinctive 
types of tobacco being treated separately. A _ roduction adjustment plan 
was worked out for each tyYe ., but all em loyed individual contracts with 
benefit payments financed out of processing tax r�tu.rns. I� is not 
necessary to study the contr&cts in detail. With the exception of the 
cigar filler and binder type tobaceo, each contract provided for a 
limitation on the acreage planted and for individual roduction quotas 
representing fhat each grower was entitle to arket. 'fhe voluntary 
contract procedure wa· reinforced by the Kerr-Smith 1'obacco Control Aet 
wt:ich levi d a tax on tobacco marketed in exeess of q:uct • 
In January of 193-'i the Supre!ll.e Court ruled that the use of the 
processing tax , as unconstitutional, and s ortly thereaft r Congress 
repeale the Kerr--S.:ni th Act. In analyzing t.�e ef.feets of theee first 
years of controlled production, Nourse , Davis, and Hlaek conclude : 
• • • that grmve a '  inco.11es were materially enhanced. • • • • 
In part this enhancement resulted from the distribution of 
more than 56 million dollars as benefit payments during the 
period. The remainder resulted f roill the substantial enhance­
men f:.s of prices under the program., w lion more than offset th 
volume curtailments that were effected. While estimates of 
these gains can be made only within wide li · ts, it seeutS 
probable that they amounted to something between 100 and 150 
million dollars. Thus growers ' ineomes from tobacco production , 
including benefit payments, were probably from 150 to 2 0 0 
million dollars larger than �hey would have been in the absence 
ot any adjustment programs. 25 
24 
It may be well to point out here that while only the tobacco 
program is presently- discussed in some detail, control programs for the 
other basic com.11odi ties to be used in a comparative price analysis in a 
later chapter were effected under the same legislation and did not differ 
substantially from the tobacco program. 
The farm program did not die with the decision of the Supreme 
Court. Tbe Soil Conserv ation and .Domestic Allotment Act was passed in 1936 
and provided the basis for the revised AAA programs. This act was an 
open offer to make benefit payments to farmers who would reduce their 
acreage of soil-depleting crops (ineluding tobacco) .  The commodity Credit 
Corporation was established to make non -recourse loans to fa.rm.ere on their 
crops and thus the loan rates became minimu.11 prices. 
In 1938, Congress reconsidered the agricultural problem and passed 
the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938. The passage of this act connoted 
a shift of emphasis from crop curtailment to a support price program. 
tnile crops were still restricted through the use of marketing agreements 
and marlceting quotas, the act made it mandatory on the Commodity Credit 
25 
Edwin G. No urse, Joseph S. Davis, John D. Black, Three Years of 
the Agricultural Adjustment Administration (Washington, D. c·. :  The 
Brookings Institute, 1937), pp. 314-315. 
25 
Corporat ion to make loans on the basic crops at 52 to 7 5  per cent of 
parity. Until this time adherence to the parity concept had been a 
matter of lip service only. Parity for the basic commodities was es­
tablished as that point at which their purchasing power would be equi 'V­
alent to t hat of the  base period, August, 190 9, to July, 1 914. Tobacco 
was the exception in that its base period was designated to be August, 
1919 to July, 192 9  because, due to shifts in consumption and changes in 
the character of tobacco produced, current prices f'or some types were 
already above parity as established by the pre-war base.  26 
In 1940 the parity· price of burley and flue-cured t-obacco was 
redefined using August, 193 4  to July, 1939 as the base period. In 
194 1  legislation was enacted which led to the support of tobacco at 85 
per cent of parity; and in 1942 support was increased to 90 per cent 
of parity. This support price was maintained throughout the next five 
years and reaffirmed by the Agricultural .Act of 1948 . The Agricultural 
Act of 1949 redefined the parity concept to take into consideration 
prices paid and prices received during the most recent ten-year period. 
For the basic commodities the level of price support was to  be dependent 
on the supply with the exception of tobacco which was to be supported 
at 90 per cent of parity, regardless of supply. 
--------
26 
Johnson, 2£• �-, P • 7. 
26 
In ullet:L-i 58 0 published by the Kentucky Agricultural Experiment 
Station, Glenn Johnson gives a clear and concise chronology o the burley 
tobacco program which can be used as a guide in studying the tobacco 
programs as  a whole and in determining their effects.27 Johnson eomes 
to the conclusion regarding burley tobacco 
• • •  that the present e-0ntrol programs are supporting the 
price of burley considerably above the free equilibrium 
price which would exist in tbe absence of such programs . 
r'Jhen changes in the purchasing power of a pound oI burley 
tobacco are compared through the years 1933 to date, it 
is evident that the purchasing power per pound of burley 
tobacco has not been increased a great deal by the pro­
grams . Similarly, when changes in the price of burley 
tobacco from the 1933-36 period to the 1946-.-49 period are 
eoinpared ,..'ith the co rresponding changes in prices of other 
farm products, it is evident that 'burley prices have not 
inc reased a great deal more than prices of ether fa.rm 
products . It follows, therefore, that the increases in 
the efficiency with which burley tobacco is being produced 
accounts for mueh of the improved current position of 
burley tobacco producers. If burley prices were permitted 
to fall to the equilibrium levels referred to in the first 
sentence of this paragraph, benefi�s of the increases in 
productive efficiency would be passed on to consumers. In 
effect, the programs have t-etained for the benefit of 
burley producers the in§ome derived from the increased 
productive efficiency. 2 
Johnson stresses a. fact with which the writer fully concurs. Any 
att�pt at evaluating the merits of the tobacco program must be assayed 
i,n· the light of the values of the person making the evaluation. The 
program involves welfare questions and therefore cannot be judged by 
27menn L.  Johnson, 
2 8Ibid. , PP • 87-88 . -
cit. 
27 
simple criteria. It is beyond the scope of this essay to evaluat,e the 
progrMI., and the problem posed by the paper does not require such an 
evaluation. For an interesting picture of priee and production move­
ments over the years of the control program, the reader is ref erred to 
the u. s.D. A. publication 'f.obaeoo which is incorporated in the Appendix 
as Figure 1.5 . 
The Tobacco Case of 1941 - --- ---.- ---- -----
While it is not t.he purpose of this pa.per to determine whether or 
not tobacco .farmers have been exploited or whether or not tobaeeo eol'!lpanies 
a.re guilty of collusion, it is virtually impossible to discuss the tobacco 
industr;y and the problems of the tobaee� grower without taking into con­
sideration what has come t,o be called. lfThe Tobacco Case of 1941. it The 
entire proceedings of  the trial have been studied as have the excellent 
analyses made by William Nicholls29 and Warren c� Baum.JO For purposes 
0f brevity and simplicity, Nicholls '  and Baum ' s  material will be drawn 
on whenever possible rather than the lengthy and complicated court 
proceedingSo 
2 9  
William H. Nicholls, Price Policies !f! the Oi&arette Indo.strr 
(Nashville :· 1'he Vanderbilt Press, 19�11,. pp. 337-403. 
30 
Wa:rren c.  Ba.um, "Workable Competition in the Tobaeeo Industry'' 
( Unpublished :Ph. D. thesis, Department of Economics, Harvard Unive rsity, 
March 1949) • 
28 
Because cri.minaJ. procedure was used, the court record is surfeit 
wlth emotional arguments and appeals to prejudice ., as ls the literature 
of the 19 2 0' s and 19 30 1 s concern ed with the is ue.  It is  inconceivable 
that a lay jury could have be en expected to comprehend the issues 
involved. 
On July 2 4, 194 0, the Government filed in the Eastern District of 
Kentucky a eriminal information charging the :major tobacc·o companies and 
leaf dealers31 with violation of the Sherman Act on four counts: 
(l ) aonspiracy to restrain trade; (2 )  monopolization; { 3} attempting to 
monopolize ; and {4) eon.spiracy to menopolize .  The companies were accused 
of having .obtained control of the leaf' marketing system and of having 
exercised this control in such a manner as to deprive tobaeeo farmers 
0f bargaining power. They were also accused of agreeing upon and 
manipulating leaf prices so as to forestall competition am;ong themselves. 
We are not here eoneerned w1 th the criminal methods allegedly employed 
by the companies on the distrib ution side. 
Defendants other than the Big 'l'hree were severed fr.om the t.-!l.al 
at its outset� on a plea of nolo cont,e.ndere. When the Big 'fhree were found - -----
guilty, the others were obliged to so plead and were fined accordingly • 
.3
l
The defendants were ; American Tobacco Company; American Suppliers; 
Liggett and Myers Tobaeco Cempany; R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, P. 
Lorillard and Company; Imperial obacco Company, Ltd. ; British American 
Toba.cco Company, Ltd .. ; Phillip Morris and Company, Ltd. ; Universal Tobacco 
Company, Inc. ; and certain of the executives of these companies. 
29 
'l'h Gove :·runent cont.ended tha · the cornpani.es had obtained control 
of t: e leaf markets by refusing to buy on a m .rket unless e h of the 
Big Three Y,ere represe tad; by ind.irectly dete!"'JJ.i. .. ing the :nnrkot open­
ing dates through t� e Tobacco Aasociation of the Uni d States ; and by 
de emining ma.�"kat rules through their repr sentation on local boards of 
rade . The Government further co tended that the co'11pa.nies controlled 
leaf prices by using advance price instruet.i.o s or f olloldng the lead 
of the .Amarican "robacco Company; by percentage buying; and by buying 
dist.inct and different kinds of t,ob,;.eco . 32 
The defendants contended., of course, that they did not, con·trol 
the leaf-marketing syst,e nor did they exert control t.)Yer prices within 
the system. ne stated that their reason for not buying on m.arKets 
where all were no+ represented · s to keep t!.1:e pr ces of tobaecQ up, 
a.l'ld the evidence would seem to have Pl'Oved th.at ·there was an adequate 
number of markets.  The companies held that there was no �vldence th·t 
they had aetually used the Tobacco A sociation of the United States or 
the boards of trade to control leaf prices or coerce warehousemen or 
growers . T" e companies argued that leaf prices -ere fixed by supply 
and de!nand., that pereentage buying w s favorable to farmers , and that 
the1 dicl not buy different grades of tobacco . 
32 
illiam H. 'Nicholls., �. �- , pp.  346-.347 . 
Of extreme interest to  this paper are t he defendants '  exhibits 
and t estimony concerning relative crop prices., 33 and this testii�ony 
will be discussed in a later chapt er. 
30 
On October 27, 1 94 1, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on all 
four counts for each of the three defendant companies, American' s  leaf­
buying subsidiary, and thirteen of their executives. The companies 
filed notice of appeal, but in higher courts t he verdict wa"8 confirmed. 
Fines were exacted, and the companies were left with the problem of 
charting their future courses of action in the light of t he verdict. 
The court had, in effect, condemned the normal consequences of t he 
oligopolistic market structure and had provided no remedial action. A 
study of ·the industry since the trial can only lead one to  believe that 
the companies are proceeding exactly as before. 
In commenting upon the practices for which t he companies were 
condemned, Baum said, 
• • • The practices are necessary, reasonable, and non­
predatory, and it is difficult to  conceiv e how the 
companies might act otherwise under t he circumstances. 
The leaf prial!i! struc·ture which reeul. ts is probably 
higher than would prevail if the three firms vrere to 
reach a monopsonistic understanding or simply to abandon 
their present common practices. A substantial increase 
in t he number of firms on the buying side1 however, would 
probably b ring higher prices to farm.ers. 34 
33
The American Tobacco Company et al. vs. United States of 
America, Vol. VI, Exhibits No. 1111, lIT.3-1141, Vol. VI, 'franscript, 
PP • 42.3 0-429 8. 
34m C - · t  2 3 "arren • .r::saum, �- �· , PP •  - • 
In reviewing the tobacco case he  said, 
Subsequent chapters vdll endeavor to show that the weight 
of circumstantial evidence is not adequate to establish 
guilt of conspiracy on most of the specific charges alleged 
by the government.  This ie particularly true of the leaf 
market, where the major lines of the alleged price-fixing 
conspiracy seem alm.ost
f:'
entirely rl thout substantial founda­
tion in the evidenca .3/ 
Summary-
'l'ne history of tobacco is a study in economic dynamics. 'l'he 
tobacco industry has grown phenomenally in the twentieth century, and 
the conceneus seems to be that tobacco prices have not kept pace with 
the rate of growth; or that , at any rat,e, the tobacco- £armer has 
suffered unjustly. The history of the indastry is one of investi­
gation and litigation which bas been instigated by the farmer. There 
has been little investig ation of relative farm prices or of the insti­
tutional faotors which may have accounted to a large degree for the 
ineome position of the undefined man known as the tobacco farme r. 
J$�., P• 80. 
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CHAPTER III 
SOM.E THEORETICAL CONS·?RUCTS IN '£HE 'l'HEORY OF 
IDNOPSO NISTIC MARKEI'S 
Much has been writ ten during the last three decades on the 
theoretical analysis of industries in which the competitive condition 
known as "oligopoly-oligopsonyn prevails .  Al though Joan Robinson ' s  
"World of Monopoliesn1 remains a beautifully clear -cut and concise 
theoretical analysis, we seem to be monng ever nearer to a. world of 
oligopolies. 
One of the earlies·t attempts to assay the contributions to the 
literature and thinking on the subject of fewness of buyers, which is 
the phase of the problem in which we are particularly interested, was 
ma.de by Ross Robertson in a master ' s  thesis at the University of Kansas 
in 19 39. 2 In this paper he renewed the writings of Otto Effertz, 
Rudolf Auspitz and Richard Lieben, Adolphe Landry, Henry Sidgwick, 
Friederich von Wieser, A. L. Bowley, J. E. Meade, and Joan Robinson. 
All have made important contributions to the theory, but it is 
.Mrs. Robinson ' s  analysis vdth which students have become most 
familiar .  
1 Joan Robinson, Economies � Im.per.feet Competition (London; 
Macmillan and Company, 1.946) , pp. )07�326. 
2 
Robertson, 2£,• cit. 
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As Robertson pointed out in his thesis, in the tremendous amount 
of literature which has been written on the subject of small numbers, 
major emphasis has been placed on the study of control over price by a 
few sellers. 3 The same has been true of more recent literature on the 
subject. 'l'he reason for such emphasis may be in part the dif'i'ioulty 
encountered when one attempts to .measure quantitatively the consequences 
of the influences on price of a few buyers. It is possible, however, 
that the tremendous interest in the position of the consumer, which had 
its origin in the early 1900 's in what is known as the nconsumer move­
ment, "  has had a direct bearing on the economist • s approach to the 
problem. American anti-trust laws focus attention on the individual as 
a purchaser who is unable to combine with other men in his own self­
interest and therefore must be protected. M.onopsony nearly always 
affects producers - -i. e • ., the seller of factor services-and the problem 
rarely appears in a harsh light, except for the case where a single firm 
may be a monopsonistio buyer of labor in a partic1.u.ar area. For these 
and other reasons, the subjects of monopsony and oligopsony are still 
field$ for fruitful research. 
For simplicity of exposition, we shall first define the types of 
markets before moving on to the complex study of oligopoly and oligopsony. 
J 
Ibi�. , P• l. 
34 
Perfect competition is said to exist in a market when the follow-
ing conditions a.re fulfilled: 
( l ) There are a large number of buyers . 
( 2) There are a large number of sellers . 
(3) There is product homogeneity. 
(4) There is complete mobility of resources . 
( 5) There is perfeet knowledge. 
No one individual acting alone ean have a significant effect on price, 
so each will a.ct as if price ·were determined by outside faetors. Yet 
the detezmination of the market price is dependent upon the actions of 
all the individuals involved in the competition. The most common illus­
trat;i,.on of &. purely competitive market is that of the agricultural 
colllm.0dity markets generally. 
Monopsony exists ¼'hen one buyer purchases a homogeneous good Irom 
a large number of selle re . Monopoly exist,s when one seller has complete 
control of a product for which there is no naar substitute ar.i.d thus his 
oontrol of the price of his product is limited only by the demm.1d curve 
for his product. The cases of pure monopoly and monopsony are rela.ti vely 
rare. 
A prevalent market type is designated as monopolistie competition; 
on the buying side its parallel is monopsonistie competition . A monop­
olistically eompetitive market has the characteristics ot pure competi­
tion in that there are many buyers and sellers; it differs in that there 
is differentiation of the product. The seller or buyer has s0me degree 
of control ever his individual prioe but little control over priees in 
general at which his product and close substitutes will be sold. 
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' he market form in which we are particularly interested is 
designated as oligopoly on the selling side and oligopaony on t he 
buying side. Such markets are characterized by f'ewness of buyers and 
sellers . The prob lem of price determination in a market where there 
are few buyers or sellers is c..u.led the problem of "small numbers. fl 
Tne first problem encountered in deali g with t, e subject is one of 
definition-how does one define 11few11 ? Whenever the sale s or purchases 
of any individual or any firm have more thax1 a negligible effect on the 
price of a good in a particular market and whe. such influenc e is not 
the r�sult of product differentiation, then the market must be olig­
opolistic or oligopaonistic. 
1 e shall accept as our definitions that oligopoly exists when 
there is a market in which a few sellers sell a homogeneous roduet to 
a large nunber of buyers and that oligopsony exists ni.len there is a 
market in which a few buyers purchase a homogeneous product from a 
large number of sellers . By definition, the.ref ore ,  the toba.cco industry 
is very nearly a perfect characterization of the oligopoly -oligopsony 
market structure. On the selling aide, the products are differentiated, 
so the arket in which the manufacturers sell is one of heterogeneous 
oligopoly. 
The distinguishing characteristic of the oligopoly-oligopsony 
market structure finds its b asis not in the homogeneity or heterogeneity 
of products (though in some instances this may be important) but in 
the fewness of buyers or sellers. The distinguishing characteristic is 
that any one seller { or buyer) by varying his output ( or takings ) can 
affect the price of t,he good or service and -thus bring about a change 
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in his rivals ' policies .  Since, in turn, a firm is partly dependent upon 
the price policy of its rivals in either buying or selling, thG induced 
change in its rivals 1 policies lllUSt have repercussions back upon itself. 
Under oligopoly or oligopsony, there is circular interdepeJidence among 
the few firms ' price and volume policies . 
110ligopoly-Oligopsony" Market Structures 
An attempt to draw together empirical data and theoretical analysis 
of oligopoly-oligopsony is a perplexing and baffling task. This is true 
because of its basic characteristic of circular interdependence. Triffin 
has said of the selling side: 
The root of the difficulty, in the ease of oligopolistic inter­
dependence, may be stated as follows: if a seller has such an 
influence upon one or several competitors that his own priee­
output. decisions are capable f influencing the price-output 
decisions of this, or these, competitors, this influence will 
be a factor to be ta.ken into account in his profit-maximizing 
calculations. This would not be so troublesome if this in­
fluence were perfectly defi ite, thw o ther sellers taking 
passively the decisions of the first as parameters of action. 
But t e ther sellers may also ha,re an influence on the first 
one, and will then try to take advantage of it to induce him 
to take some price-output decision favorable to t 1eir own 
interests . It is this mutual, but indecisive, influence that 
opens the door to an infinitely varied pa. tern of possibilities. ­
The oligopolists may be afraid of unleashing unpredictable 
reactions ,  and are thus frozen into a policy· of immobility. 
Or, on the contrary, they may feel in a fighting spirit and 
launch an undercutting policy in the hope of' ruining their 
rivals and d.r1 ving them from the field. Or again, they may 
aceept., tacitly or expressly , unres ervedly or only within 
some more or l ess definite range, the lead of one of them and 
abstain from price competition. Any number of tacit agree­
ments are conceivable {partition of the market according to 
various eri teria, limit to advertising expenditure , ete . ) ,  
and any amount of restriction on competition. If, as is usual, 
price competition is baITed, other types of competition may 
or may not be preserved: co. petition with respect to service, 
to advertising, to pressure upon government agencies to obtain 
big orders or tariff favors, etc ,  • • •  � Such considerations 
as financial backing, political influenc.e, prestige psychology, 
optimistic or pessimistic slant, enterprising or routine-like 
attitude in business,  etc . ,  �ay well play an overwhelming role 
in determining the solution. 
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The extent of concentration in the tobacco induatry will be the 
subject of comment and discussion in various sections of the paper. As 
has been shown, in the days of t he 'rrust the .American Tobacco Company 
controlled -86 per cent of the cigarette - arket and even greater per­
centages of o ther tobacco products arkets . After the dissolution of 
the 'fI•ust, the successor companies begsn to establish their cont rol. 
By 193 4  he three largest domestic companies purchased 46 per cent of 
the leaf' offered, :ith the largest company taking 22 per cent. ' •r:nese 
figures, however, do not show the extent of control because of the 
locali:t.ation of the various types of tobacco and the differing usages 
to which they are put. 
4nobert Triffin, Monopolistic Competition and General Equilibrium 
'.Theory { Cambridge: Ha:rva.rd University Press, 1940), pp. 70-71. - Quoteci 
in Nicholls , op. cit. , p.  151 • ......_ _  
5 Federal trade Commission, A&ricultural Ineome Inquiry:, 1938, 
p. 260. 
The two most important t;vpes of tobacco are burley and flue­
eured; the leading markets for these tob ccos are Lexington, Kentucky, 
e.nd lson, o rth Carolina, resped,ively. Table II shows the degree 
of' control on these two leading eigare·t.·t.e-t,obacco markets . l'he three 
largest tobacco companies in 193 4  distrib uted 80 .1 per oent of the 
cigarettes in the United States, and the largest single manufacturer 
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·< . 
distributed 27 . 3  per cent of the cigarettes. 0 The same three companies 
are also the largest manufacturers of smoking tobacco and, with one 
exception, chewing tobacco. None produce snuff. The degree of concen­
tration in the cigar industry is relatively small because of the fact 
that it remained a hand process until rocent years. 
Table III shows the concentration of leaf tobacco purchases in 
the 1938 crop year. Unfort,unately, there are no lat,er studies to 
i dicate the amount of concentration of leaf purchases in the 1 940 • s. 
It ca.""l be assumed, however, that the same high degree of concentration 
exists. There have been no changes in the buying policies of the 
major companies, and observation of isol ted market, operations would 
onfirm this vie • 
Thei� is more recent information concerning concentration on 
the distribution side. l"igu.res published in a 19 49 report by the Federal 
lrade Commission indicate that in 1947 36.6 per cent of the net capital 




CONCENTRATION OF CONTROL OF PURCHASES OF TOBACCO AT THE 
NATION'S TWO LA.RGF;ST '?OBACCO LEAF MARKE?S, 19 33- 19 3,a 
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Average Pereentage (193J-19JS) of 
Total Tobacco Leaf Sales Bought bl 
Three Largest Largest 
Market and Type 
of T-obaceo 
Lexington ., Ky. {Burley ) 
Wilson, N. c. (Flue-cured ) 
Largest Single Single 
Domestic Domestic Export 
B�ers Buyer Buyer 
61. 3 
24. a  
24. 7 
12.6 2 3. 2  
aTable taken from William H. Nicholls, Imperfect Competition 









LEAF TOBACCO PURCHASES BY SIX COMPANIES 
AND BY ALL OTHERS, 19.38 CROP YEARa 
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16, 7  
16.0 
a 
Richard B,. Tennant, .2£• �- , p. 208. 
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cent by two companies, 77.6 per cent by three companies, and 8 7  . 8  per 
eent by four companies. 7 Table IV illustrates the exten·I;. of concentra­
tion in the production of cigarettes in the past two decades. A 
pictorial presenta-t.ion of the  coneentl:'ation in tobacco manufactures 
is incorporated in the Appendix as Figure 14. 
We have seen that the actions of an oligopolist or an oligop­
sonist depend upon his rivals ' actions . 
In exploring this idea, William Fellner has said: 
The oligopolist, instead of "setting up" a supply .function, 
attempts to s elect a definite price to be charged and a definite 
quantity to b e  sold, wr.�eh, in combination with one another, 
are optimal from his point of view. But the quantity he is 
capable of selling at any given price depends on the prices 
charged by his competitors, which, in turn, are appreciably 
affected by  what price he sets. Consequently, not only does 
·the oligopolist fail to set up a supply .function, but also it 
is impossible to define for him a demand function from in­
formation pertaining to buyers ' preferences alone. Similarly, 
the oligopsonist, instead of s etting up a d emand function, 
attempts to select a definite price to be  paid for the 
materials and s ervices he buys and a definite quantity to 
be purchased, which, in combination with one another, a.re 
optimal from his point of view. But the quantity he is 
capable of buying at any giv en price depends on the prices 
paid by his competitors, which, in turn, are appreciably 
affected by what price he pays . Consequently, he  not only 
fails to set up a dema.ndf'Unction, but also is not faced with 
a supply function such as co uld be calculated from techno­
logical data and utility functions alone. 8 
Felln er proceeds to work out a theory of det ermination based on 
conjectural interdependence which is somewhat beyond the scope of this 
8William Fellner, Competition Among the Few (New York = Al.fred A. 
Knopf, 1949), p .  11. 



















ESTIMATED PERCENTAGE OF CIGARE'fTE OUTPUT 
BY LEADIN G COMPANTESa 
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31. 1 
35 .4  
2 1.6 
2 1. 2  
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2 1. 3 
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2 1k,  
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21. 2  
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2. 3  
J . 2 
4.8 
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7 .6  




11. 6  
Source: Estimated by Standard and Poor 1 s Corporation in Standard 
! Poor ' s  Industry: Survers, "Tobacco, " March 27, 1952., p. T4-4. 
paper. His quotation is used to illustrate the position in which the 
oligopolist or oligopsonist finds himself when he el'1deavors to set his 
prices . 
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This leads us into Nicholls ' classification of oligopoly­
oligopsony. The prices and volumes resulting under this type of market 
structure will depend upon the relationships existing between the few 
firms; that is, whether there is formal collusion, and, if not, -what 
each firm expects his rivals to do . The policies of any one firm, where 
there is �  formal collusion, depend upon whether or not it recognizes 
the existence of circular interdependence and whether or not it correctly 
judges the timing and extent of interactions which any change in its 
policies sets in motion. 
Nieholls offers as typical limiting cases of oligopoly-oligopsony 
those presented in the following outline :9 
I .  Where firms formally combine : 
A.  Formal collusion 
B. Complete merger 
II. Where firms do not formally combine : 
A. A few firms of about aqual size : 
1 .  Perfect knowledge 
2 . Limited knowledge 
( a) Circular interdependence ignored: 
(1) Rivals ' purchases and sales assumed fixed 
( 2) Rivals ' buying and selling prices assumed 
fixed 
( 3) Follower-leader pattern 
{b} Circular interdependence recognized: 
(1) Extent and timing unknown 
( 2) Extent and timing known 
9
Nicholls, 2£_• .£!!• , PP• 83-84. 
a.) Rivals ' price assUJ'.led always 
uniform with own price 
b) Rivals ' percentage of total pur­
chases and of total sales assumed 
fixed (market-sharing) 
B. One or a raw vecy la rge firms and many small firms: 
1. One dominant firm 
2. A few dominant firms 
There is neither time nor need to discuss the t...>ieory of ea.ch of 
these types. We must be concerned, however, with the placing of the 
modern tobacco industry within this theoretical framework. The period 
between 18 90 and 1 910 was one of formal collusion and finally of merger 
in the tobacco industry. There are those who hold that the modern 
industry has also been guilty of formal collusion. As was pointed out 
in Chapter II, e n.dence of collusion which was presented in the F'TC 
hearings of the 192 01 s and the 194 1 trial was not conclusive. f.'urther 
analysis will show that formal collusion has not been a necessary means 
to the ends desired by the industry. The modern tobacco industry 
(19 11 to date) in its early years fits rather neatly into Nicholls •  
classification. It was an industry in which firms did not formally 
combine; there were a few firms of about equal size; and there was 
limited knowledge . The circular interdependence was recogr ized, but 
its extent and timing were unknown. This is the most difficult of the 
oligopoly-oligopsony types with which to deal from a theoretical stand­
point . If the firm determines its purchase and sales curves on the 
assumption that its rivals will react in a certain manner, even though 
the assumption may be erroneous., it at least has a starting point. But 
if the firm is simply uncertain as to what assumptions to make as to 
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its rivals ' prices and volume of sales its prQble.us a.re increased tre­
mendously. For each oligopolist-oligopsonist, there ·will be a number 
of sales and purehases curves, and a stable equilibrium will exist only 
if (1) each has guessed its rivals ' reactions correctly and ( 2) the 
resulting division of business has b een at the same time the optimum 
adjustment for each. 
Since such adjustment is highly problematical, what price 
situation may be expected? Chamberlin has concluded that the price 
may b e  anywhere between the li,ni ts of collusive oligop-0ly-oligopsony 
and pure com.petition 11 • • •  depending upon the one v,hich chance, shrewd­
ness, or desperation leads him to choose, and de ending also upon whether 
his rival chooses the same one. n1° Chamberlin has pointed out several 
reasons for uncertai.nty as to the extent and timing of rivals ' reactions .  
In the first place, if each entrepreneur assumes his rival ' s  present 
policy to be unaffected by changes in his own policy, he has no way of 
knowing whether this fixity will express itself in his rival 1 s volmne 
or in his price . Secondly 1 hereas an entrepreneur ma
y be aware of his 
influence upon competitors ' reactions , he has no certainty that they 
are aware of theiI' influence upon his.  Again, w en the number of com­
petitors is small, each may be able to perceive his interdependence but 
be unable to determine the degree of reaction to be expected • .And 
10E. H. Chamberlin, Theory £! Monopolistic Com.petition (3d ed. ; 
Cambridge : Harvard University Press, 1939), p. 51. 
finally, each of the competitors may be in doubt as to the timing of 
his rivals ' reactions. 11 
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As the tobacco industry has developed, it has passed into the 
stage where the extent and ti.ming of the competitors ' reactions are 
apparently known to each other. Stigler has held that there is an 
interim between these two cases in which there usually occurs formal 
collusion while the compet.itors work out rules of the game.12 While 
this may be true in most cases, it should not have been necessary in 
the case of the tobacco companies which had worked together in the 
Trust.1 3  If circular interdependence is recognized and extent and 
timing of ri val.s ' reactions are known, we ma.y suppose that the tobacco 
companies have correctly assumed that any price cut in selling or price 
increase in buying on the part of one will be met by the others. Each 
realizes the futility of price competition, so that even though the 
firms are completely independent, the equilibrium prices and volumes 
in both buying and selling may well be those which would exist under 
formal collusion. This result would, of course, be most profitable for 
all the firms. 
ll
�., PP• 51-5J . 
12George J. Stigler, "Notes on the Theory of Duopoly, " Journal 
.2!, Political Econo&, 48 :533, August 1 940. 
13Ari opinion with which there is not complete concurrence by 
writers in the field. 
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Certain of the evidence presented in the Federal Trade Commission ' s  
Report � the Tobaeco Industry of 19 21 would indicate that there was 
some degree of uncertainty among the tobacco companies as to the motives 
of their rivals so that the prices might be established someffllat above 
the formal collusion prices. Equilibrium at the formal collusion level 
depends upon perfect knowledge which is, in t,urn, dependent upon ex-
perience . 
Burns has remarked that there is little evidence of market-sharing 
among the tebacco eompanies. 14 Such sharing would simply be additional 
evidence o! know-ledge of' extent and timing of rivals ' reactions . Nicholls 
interprets the absence of market-sharing as being due to the dynamic 
nature of  the cigarette industry in the past years whieh has prevented 
it from settling down to any eonsistent market pattern. 
An over-all analysis of oligopoly -oligopsony points to the 
probability that, where an industry is dominated by a few large .firms, 
pricing policies in both buying and selling will tend to be nonaggres­
si ve. This statement has real significance when one realizes that 
evidence of lack of aggressiveness in pricing has been used to convict 
the tobacco companies on criminal charges, whereas it is in reality a 
natural characteristic of their market structure. 
14 
A. R. Burns, The Decline � Competition (New· York : .McGraw-Hill, 
1936), p. 14 0. 
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Some Remarks on Exploitation 
As has been pointed out earlier an ideal analysis of the tobacco 
farmer's  position could be made by a measurement of t.he exploitation to 
whi ch he is subjected due to the competitive or non-competitive marketing 
structure he faces when he sells his tobacco. Su.eh an  analysis, however, 
seems virtually impossible because of the unavailability of :reliable 
cost figures for either the farmer or the tobacco manufacturing companies. 
Because the oligopoly-oligopsony theory leads to the conclusion 
that the tobacco farmer is in an ideal position to be exploited - whether 
or not such position is being taken advantage o.f by the companies--it 
may be well to consider briefly the theory of exploitation. 
As is true with mueh economic terminology, the very word 
11exploitation11 has been interpreted by different writers in different 
lights. Consequently, it has lost its precise definition and has become 
more or less adaptable to varying situations . As Gordon F .  Bloom has 
remarked, 11.Exploitation, like discrimination and monopoly, has ceased 
to be a noun and has beeome a nQise. 11 15 Nevertheless, the word still 
has a precise meaning. This we proceed to define. 
Consider first the case of a pure monopsonist wtio is a monopolist 
with respect to the sale of his manufactured product. Such a market 
situation is, of course., a normative one . Like that of a perfectly 
15 
Gordon F. Bloom, "A  Reconsideration of the Theory of' Exploitatioaj1 
Readings !!!. the Theo
$ � 
Income Distribution (Philadelphia :  The Blakiston 
Company, 194oT;° p .  2 
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competitive market, the concept is helpful even though the precise 
marl<:et type is never eneountered in the real world. Certainly, however, 
this was the approximate position of the old American Tobacco Company 
before the dissolution decree of 1911. 
In Figura l inputs of factor (in this case , tobacco ) are measured 
along the OX axis and price is measured along the OY axis. There are 
four relevant quantities which vary as input of the factor varies. 
'fhese are the average outlays on the ±'actor, the marginal outlays on 
the factor, the average net productivitl of the factor, and the 
marginal � productivity of the factor. 16 A monopsonist with respect 
to a factor, who is a monopolist with respect to the sale of the manu­
factured product, :rill take the agen·t of production up to the point 
where marginal outlay and marginal net productivity are equal. Thus, a. 
qu.antity of the £actor (tobacco) OQ Will be taken at a price per unit 
OP, even though the marginal net productivity is OR and average net 
productivity is OS. The price OP is sufficient to call forth the 
quantity OQ, at ..hich profits for the monopsonist-monopolis·i., are max­
imized, and the monopaony-monopoly profits are represented by the area 
PMNS. If the factors were combined in the same proportions under pure 
16 
Some writers, like Professor William Nicholls, prefer the con­
struction of curves of derived average revenue and derived marginal 
revenue to that of productivity curves. The meaning is precisely· the 
same no matter which terminology is u.sed. 
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compet,ition, the amount of the factor taken under pure competition would 
be OQ • and the campeti ti ve price would be OP 1 • It is not likely t..l:i.at 
the factors would be combined in the same proportions under conditions 
of both monopoly and pure colnpetition, but it is certain that the quantity 
emplo;y,ad and the price paid under a competitive system would be greater 
than under a :monopoly. 
A moment • s  reflection will assure the reader that these fai."Tliliar 
conclusions of partial equilibrium analysis are valid. Under the most 
general case of the technical combination of the factors, we ta..�e it 
that, as inputs of a variable agent increase, the curve of average 
physical product will rise at first and then fall. It follows that the 
curve of marginal physical product will rise through an early range of 
inputs of the .factor and then fall.. Mow the value of the marginal 
physical product is obtained by multiplying marginal physical product 
by average revenue ( selling price) whereas the marginal value product 
is obtained by multiplying marg.l.nal physical product by marginal revenue. 
Under conditions of pure competition the value of the marginal produGt 
will be equal because average revenue and marginal revenue are equal . 
But in those situations when output is sold in an imperfect market, the 
marginal value product mu.st be less than the value of the marginal 
product for the simple reason that marginal revenue will be less t.�an 
average revenue. 
Thus, under perfect competition any unit of a factor will receive 
both the value of its marginal product and its marginal value product. 
The entrepreneur, if he would maximize net revenue, will take any faetor 
up to the point where the marginal value product of the factor is equal 
to the marginal outlay on the £actor; to hire an agent beyond this 
point would add more to costs than it vro uld add to revenue . Now the 
principle by which the monopolist is guided in hiring (purchasing) an 
agent of production is the same as ·that by which the entrepreneur under 
pei1'ect competition is guided. He, too, will take units of a factor 
up to the point where marginal value product of the agent and marginal 
outlay are equal � 'l'wo broad eases are possible. If the monopolist 
hi.res an agent in a pure marke t, average outlay and ma.rgi.nal outlay 
' ll be the same . But. since he sells his product in an imperfect market, 
the marginal value product of the agent will be less than the value o '  
its marginal product. Thus, if we take it that nexploitation" occurs 
whenever a factor receives less than the value of its marginal product, 
t't  is kind .of 11monopolistic exploi tation11 results even though the agent 
of production is bought in a perfectly competitive 111a:rket . 17 
If, howev--er, , e restrict our notion of exploitation to the situation 
in \'Jhich a fact.or receives less than its marginal value product, we shall 
find the manifestation of such exploitation in the second of the t-wo cases 
suggested above. A monopolist may very well be a monopsonist of some 
agent necessary to his combination. Normally the average outlays 
17 
Compare Joan Robinson; �· �·, especially pp. 28 4-288. 
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necessary to obtain greater and greater quantities of the agent ,rill 
increase . In a pure market for the agent the ourve of average outlays 
would constitute a supply curye. The m.onopsonist., however, will equate 
marginal outlays and marginal value product. Thus, for any input the 
agent will receive an amount indicated by the curve of average outlays 
(average � to the supplier of the agent ) .  Since the average outlay 
curve is rising, the curve marginal to it must be above it. Hence the. 
factor eannot but receive le ss than its marginal value product and 
ttmonopsonistic exploitation" occurs. 18 
The explana:t.ory discussion has thus far been confined to short 
periods of time. But the notion of average and marginal � productiv ity 
(see Figm•e l ) implies a time period sufficiently long to permit changes 
in inputs of all the factors. Thus av erage w::oss productivity is the 
average value of output per unit of former variable factor--let us now 
say tobaec0 -and the marginal eyoss productivity is the increment of 
value of output resulting from adding to t-he productive combination 
an additional unit of tobacco with the appropriate addition � other 
factors. Thus, average � productivity is the average value of output 
18 
The merits of defining explei tation as occurring when a factor 
receives less than its marginal value produet versus those of defining 
exploitation as resulting when the factor reeeives less than the value 
of its marginal product need not be gone into here for the reason that 
we are focusin.g attention on the monopsony problem. For discussion see 
Joan Robinson, op. cit. , PP• 28 1- 3 04, W. H. Nicholls, op. cit. , PP • 58-
6 3, and A .  C. Pigou, The Economics of Welfare ( 3d. ed. T°London : Macmillan 
& Company, 1946 ) ,  pp o 551 ,!!:• seq. -
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per unit input of tobacco minus the average outlays on other factors 
employed. Marginal net productivity is the marginal net increment of 
value of output resulting from the input of an additional unit of tobacco . 
It is,  then, the quantity which is marginal to average net productivity. 
Given a perfectly competitive rM.rket in equilibrium, for any firm 
marginal net productiv.ity and average net productivity will equal both 
average and marginal ou·cla.ys on tobacco . Thus, for a perfectly competi­
tive industry, the curve of average net prod"UCtivity would constitute a 
demand curve for tobacco . The monopsonist, hov1ever, pc1.ys at�ntion only 
to the two rel0vant marginal quantities . ( See Figure 1. ) 
To rcturr to our original discussion, the total profits of the 
.monopolist-monopsonist (Figure 1) will equal the area P:ANS. The monop­
sonistic exploitation is  indicated by the rectangle P!ll(R. There is 
nothing sinister or ovil about the existence of the exploitation. It 
follows from the attenpt of the entrepreneur to maximize net revenue. 
But exploitation, even as 1ere narro ily defined, implies a worse economic 
position for the suppliers of a factor than would othen."'i.se prevail. 
Ideally, 111e should like to measure the exploitation. But how 
ahall we proceed? The relevant productivity and cost figures are simply 
not available, nor, by any stretch of the i.:magina:i;,ion, will the cost 
figures for tobacco ever be . Yet we should like to devise some means 
of testing the validity of' the proposition that the tobacco grover is 
\Vorse off than other agriculturists. In the chapter which follows such 
a means of testing will be suggested . 
CHAPl'ER IV 
COMPARATIVE COMMODIT'l ANALYSES 
The sketch of the theory of price determination in a market iR 
which some element of monopsony· is pres ent may eause the unwary to make 
hasty inferences. The static a.11aly-sis within the framework of neo­
classical theory appears to lead to the conclusion to which tobacco 
growers have always eome--that tobacco prices have bean lower and out­
put less than if "competition» had prevailed among the buyers of their 
product. !et we are here confronted with a problem in economic dynamics 
in which the relevant variables change over time. 
The thought must occur to anyone who seriously considers the 
matter t11at tobacco may have a certain advantage which the growers of 
.farm products general.l.y may not have. That advantage lies in the fact 
tha� the finished good, of which their crop is the  chief raw material, 
is sold by an oligopolistic industry. May not these few firms, by 
affecting th e position and shape of the d emand curv es for tobacco 
products and by aohieving more efficient scales b enefit themselves and 
place their suppliers in a position quite favorable r elative to those 
growers whose product is sold under conditions of pure competition? A 
cursory examination of the raw data on price and income figures indicate 
that this question may b e  a.�swered affirmatively. 
This problem is only a small phase of a broader problem with 
which agricultural economists have had to grapple--an explanation of 
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"the agricultural problem., " which is of an evolutionary nature and is a 
problem in dynamics. This challenge has not gone unaccepted. Much work 
has been done by what has been referred to as the "Am.es School," and such 
men has Theodore Schultz, Gale Johnson, and E. o. Heady l1ave proposed 
interesting and helpful solutions. 1 This "School" has set up a framework 
within which we ean explain the evolution of "the" agricultural problem 
by tracing o·ver time forces which affect the supply of and the demand 
for farm products. Close scrutiny of the prices farmers receive, their 
income from crops, and the prices they pay for the things they buy will 
certainly give an indication of the relative position of agricul.tu...""e. 2 
What has been needed, however, is a measuring device with which a single 
index of relative welfare can be .formulated. Such a device is furnished 
in the terms of exchange. 
l 
Most helpful to the present inquiry have been two works of 
Theodore Schultz : .Agrieulture i!!, an Unstable Economz, �- cit . ,  Md 
Production � Welfare 2!. Agriculture (New York: Macmillan, 19 49 ) .  
2
In the tobacco case of 194 1  the defendants offered as evidence 
certain statistical material designed to show comparisons among farm 
prices. The data were in the form of index numbers showing price changes 
of tobacco, wheat, cotton, corn, fruits ., dairy products , chicken and eggs., 
hogs, beef cattle, and all farm products for the period 19 21- 1939. Graphs 
had been constructed, and in most instanees these showed the index of 
tobacco prices well above those of other farm products. This evidence 
was offered by Dr. John Coulter, a eonsulting economist and statistician 
in the field of agriculture. His direet testimony was clear and impres­
sive , but the limitations of his analysis were emphasized by the Govern­
ment in cross-examination . The evidence probably had little effect on 
the lay jury, and its very nature led to discussion which could only 
cloud and obscure the issues. 
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The terms-of-exchange co.i.cept involves the determination of the 
relationship between the prices which a farmer pays for products he bU¥s 
and the prices which he receives for the produc·lis he sells . The tech­
nique of formulating terms of  exchange has been explained in some detail 
in the introductory chapter; speclfic illustrations of the method w.ill 
follow shortly. The ten:ns-of-exchange concept is no panacea. It deals 
with aggregates , and there is danger that the effect of some isolated 
forees operating in the economy may be missed. But as a consequence of  
its use some misapprehensions may be corrected. As has been noted 
repeatedly, it is generally accepted tha:t because o:f peculiar condi­
tions of competition in the tobacco industry the tobacco farmer is put 
upon, and the implication haa been that of all farme rs h_ts lot is the 
worst. If we jum.p from the static theoretical analysis ·t,o this con­
clusion, we fall into serious error. 
It is generally recognized that the significance of 1.1. statistical 
presentation depends upon t-he integrity of t.lle stet.istician. It is an 
old and, in most instances, true saying that figu.res can be used to 
prove anything. The method of analysis here presented has been checked 
carefully with atatiaticians , and mueh thought has boen given to the 
question of whether the preaenta t,ion may be bias,:d because of arbitrary 
s-election of base period for index numbers or for te:rm.s-of-exehange 
• l "  incuces. 
As has been mentioned before, t 1e selection of the base year for 
the terms-of-exchange indices is to some extent an arbitrary one . A. base 
period is considered by statisticians simply as a convenient starting 
point; it is racogniz.ed that there is no period -which is "normal" in 
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the accepted sense of "the word. In selecting the base year for the 
terms-of-exchange indices, emphasis has been placed upon ths seleetion 
of years which ar0 of historical si gnificance with tha recognition, 
however, -that the choice i:,f a year in which there aro gross price dis­
tortions will present an u.'llfair picture of the tenr!$ -of-exohange 
relationshlp • .3 ,ith one axception., which will be noted later , the 
years 191 0 and 1 933 have been used as baSGl y-e&rs in the computation of 
terms-of-exchange indices. These yea.rs were selected for their con­
venience and for their historical importance, 1910 being t.he year before 
the dissolution of the Trust and 1933 being the first yea.:r of ext.ensi ve 
Qcvern.�ent progra1J1s of agricultural aid. 
Terms of Exchange 
Table VI contains data for the years 1 890-1 916 ., inclusive, the 
first twenty of these years being those in which the Tobacco Trust, 
the original American Tobacco Company, was in operation. In order to 
.3 
A terms-of-exchange index of tobacco and food grains for the 
1933-19 50 period tl'as constructed using 1944 as the base year f'or the 
index. In 1944 the price index (1 91 0-191 4 = 1 0) for tobacco stood at 
348, over three and one-half times that of 19 3; the price index for 
food grains was 165, just over one and one-half times that of 1 933. A 
graphic presentation on this basis of the terms of exchange showed food 
grains in a favorable position -throughout the period. Such an analysis 
demonstrates the difficulty of selecting as a base period a year of 
extremes. 
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familiarize the reader with the procedure, the method by which this 
table was constructed will be explained in some detail. The industry 
series is one published by the U. s.  Bureau of Labor Statistics; 1913 
is the base year and the index is based on a weighted average of prices 
of seventy manufactured commodities. 4  No agricultural index with a 
191.3 base period was available, so an index was constructed by taking 
the average prices of the commodities to be  compared for the period 
18 90-1916.' In each instance the average price for 1913 was set equal 
to 100, and the index for the other years then computed. Table V is 
a worksheet which shows how terms of exchange between all farm products 
and the seventy manufactured commodities are obtained after the data are 
translated into index numbers. Column l is the index of prices for "all 
farm products; "  column 2 is the index of prices for manufactured commod­
ities . Column J, which is the ratio b etween columns 1 and 2,  is obtained 
by dividing column 1 by column 2. The year 18 90 was chosen as the base 
year for the terms-of-exchange index b ecause it was the first year of 
operation of the Tobacco Trust. Putting 80. 6  equal to 100, column 4 
is readily obtained ( 80. 6 = 87.6, etc. ) .  The terms of exchange for 
100 X 
eaeh commodity are computed in a like manner and are presented in Table 
VI. Figure 2 is a graphic presentation of the material contained in 
Tables V and VI. 
Prices 
4u. s. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
� Pre-War Base, Washington, 1928. 
5 U. S .  Department of Agriculture, 
Index umbers of Wholesale - ----





























COMPUTATION OF TERMS OF EXCHANGE FOR ALL 
FARM PRODUCTS, 1890 = 100 
Manufactured 
Farm Productsa Com.inod1 tiesb Ratio 
69 . 8  86 .6 80.6  
75 .0 85.6  87.6 
68 .5  81.5 84 
70. 7  83 . 2  84.9 
61. 4  72. 4 84. 8 
61. 2  72 .S 84.4 
5).0 7 0.1  78 .4 
59 . 2  71. 2  83 . 1  
62 . 8  73 . 6 85.3 
64. 1  78 . 5  81 . 7  
70. 4  83.0 84. 8  
73 .6  81 • .5 90.3  
81.4 86.9 93. 7 
77 .2  a.5 .9 89 .8  
81.1 86.2  94 
78.8  88. ,  89 
80.J  87.5 91. 8  
86. 7  94. 2 92 
86.S  92.8 93 . 2  
97.0 97.8 99 . 2 
103. 2  101. 4 101. 8  
93.0  92 .9  100.1 
101 . J  99 .7 101. 6 
100. 0  100.0 100. 0  
102 .6  101.0 101.6 
10.3 .,  105.9  98 . 1  
122.8 131.0  93. 7  































Compiled from 1939 Agricultural Statistics,  USDA, 1913 = 10 0. 
0u. s. Bureau of' Labor Statistics, Index Numbers of Wholesale 





























TERMS OF EXCHANGE FOR ALL CROPS, TOBACCO; WHEAT, 
AND COTrOW., 1890-1916, 1890 ::: 100 
All Crops Tobacco Wheat 
100 100 100 
109 10.3 100 
104 118 79 
105 10 2 66 
105 99 70 
105 101 72 
97 84 106 
10 3 12 ll7 
106 90 81 
101 96 78 
105 86 77 
112 94 80 
116 85 75 
ill 8.3 84 
117 91 ill 
llO 99 87 
114 ll8 78 
114 114 95 
116 119 108 
123 111 105 
126 99 93 
124 1 0 8 97 
126 ll6 79 
124 138 a; 
126 10$ 100 
122 92 90 
116 12 1 127 
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The relationships indicated in F�gure 2 are those which could be 
expected from the brief survey of the Trust years . The terms of exchange, 
compared with those for agriculture· as a whole, are generally unfavorable 
for the tobaeco grower through 1910 . (The words ttfavorable" and nun­
favorable" are concerned with the relative position of the terms of 
exchange for one commodity as against another. In the usual sense of 
the words, terms wo uld be .favorable for a speeific commodity only if 
they were · above 100. However, the implication here is one of :relativity, 
and tobaeeo terms of exchange may be favorable as compared with other 
terms when they are well below 100. )  The graph would indicate that the 
eff eet on prices of the f orw.ation of the original America...l"l Tobacco 
Company was not felt strongly until 189 3. During the next seventeen. 
years tobacco tenns of exchange compared favorably wit,h the terms of 
exchange for all crops in only three years--1897, 1906, and 1908 . It 
is \vorl-h noting that during this period, when it ma.y be concluded that 
the tobacco growers were being seriously and persistently exploited by 
the Trust, the tobacco terms of exchange were not subject to the severe 
fluctuations which characterized those of the wheat and cotton growers. 
It is also significant that during most of the period under consider­
ation the terms of exchange for wheat f a.rmers showed them at a distinct 
disadvantage as compared with tobacco growers. 
Tabla VII presents the terms of exchange ( 191 0 = 1 0 0) for tob acco, 
wheat., and cotton for the period 191 0-1 9.3 7 • Wheat and cot.ton were singled 






























TERMS OF EXCHANGE FOR TOBACCO, WHEAT, AND 





























































markets which approach the norm of upurett competition. The year 1926 
was selected as the base y ear for the computation of the price indices 
because it ·was a year in which tobacco was relatively well off price­
wise, so that if there is bias because of the selection of the base 
period, it would be in fa.vor of the wheat and cotton farmers . The 
industry index, which is a weighted ind.ax of wholesale pr ices of all 
comm.odi ties, is taken from a Bureau of Labor StaM.stics publication 
taking 1926 as the base period .6 This is not a perfect index for the 
purpose because we are in reality comparing farm products against them­
selves to the extent that their prices are contained in the wholesale 
ind.ex. Nevertheless, the 1926 index was available., and a consistent 
comparison was possible . The agricultural indices were compiled from 
a selected series of average price s .7 
Figure 3 is a graphic presentation of Table VII. One can 
readily see that the tobacco terms of exchange are generally highly 
favorable . Wheat has a slight advantage in 191 1  and is in a very 
favorable position in the period 19 15- 19 17. The favorable position in 
the 19 1� -191 7  period was, of course, the result of the greatly increased 
demand for wheat products du.ring World War r .8 
6 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Historical Statistics r 1801 to 191'.5, 
Wholesale Price Indices, Series IJ. 5. 
- - -
7
Frederick Strauss and Louis H. Bean, Gross Farm Income and Indiees 
� � Production � Prices in � United States, l6b 9-illl, (Washington: 
USDA, Technical Bulletin No. 703, December 1940). 
8suoh information as to changes in demand and supply conditions is 
taken from various copies of Yearbook 2£ Agriculture published by the U. s. 
Department of Agriculture unless otherwise cited. 
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Figure 4 is a graphic presentation of Table VIII. Here terms of 
exch ange are computed for "all ero:ps, 11 tobacco, cotton, and food grains 
for the -period 1910-1932, inclusive, with 1910 as the base year. 'l'he 
price indices are computed on a 191 0-1914 base period. The industry 
series is a wholesale priee series of all commodities and again is 
imperfect in that it includes agricultural prices. 9 The agricultural 
price indices are those constructed by the Depa.rt.ment of Agriculture on 
a 1910-1914 base.10 As will be noted, certain of the time periods under 
eonsio.eration have been analyzed more than 01:ice. This is n ..ot needless 
repetition, because in each instance a different industry series or a 
different base :period. has been used. Such repetition would st.rengthen 
the ·vi�"'Wpoint that our terms-of-exchange relationship is valid. As can 
be observed, much of the same relationship is evidenced by Figure 4 as 
was evidenced by Figure 3. In this insta.TJ.ce, however, the favorable 
position of tobacco as measured by terms of exchange is mor e pronounced. 
In only one year, 1915, do the terms of exchange for food grains lie 
9 
U. s. Departm ent of Commerce, Historical Statistics of the 
Uro.ted States 1789-l9)i5 (Washington, 1949), Series L2, p. 231.-
10 
U. S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Statistics, 
1944 and 1 951. There is a slight discrepancy in that the indices for 
the 1910-1928 period are constructed on a basis of average prices for 
the period August 1 909-July 1914 whereas the 1929- 1950 indices are on 
a 1910-1914 base.. The Department of Agriculture shifted its bass 
period because of the greater ease with which prices could be obtained 
for calendar y-ears . The variation in the indices is so slight that they 
can be used interchangeably with the same results . This has been done 

























TERMS OF EXCHANGE FOR ALL CROPS, TOBACCO, COTTON, AND 
FOOD GRAINS, 1910- 1932, 19 10 = 100 
68 
All Crops 'l'obaeeo C otton Food Grains 
10  10 0 100 10 0 
105 107 97 97 
99 123 78 96 
96 145 87 84 
95 1.33 16 9$ 
9.3 100 66 118 
94 106 81 lOl 
109 12 9 ?4 12) 
11.J 155 114 115 
ll 2 183 109 u, 
103 126 10 2 104 
85 140 65 86 
96 160 10 1 78 
10$ 157 13, 72 
109 148 138 84 
10 8 136 108 107 
96 142 76 98 
97 144 85 92 
10 2 149 97 86 
97 147 98 80 
92 133 75 70 
71 110 55 













above those of tobacco, and in a1.l other years the favorable relation-
ship is obvious . 
The next analysis i.s  based wholly on indices publi8hed by the 
Department of Agriculture ( 1910-1914 = 100) ., These <;l.l"e the "prices 
paid11 11 and "prices reeei ved" indices used by the Depar-tment in. formu-. 
lating its parity concept. 12 The "prices paid11 index contains all 
eo:mmodi ty prices, including interest and truces, paid by farmers . The 
Department publishes other j_ndices concerned only with commodities used 
in production, com.�odities used for home eonsumption, at� . ,  but it 
appears t hat the index of all com.modi ty price!! is the relevant one . 
The ar..alyse� are eoneerned ��t.h the 1910-1932 and 1933-1950 pe�iods; 
1910 and 19.33, respectively, are used as t,he base years £or the terms­
of-excha.nge indices. 
Table IX a.lld Figure 5 present. <ls.ta for the yea.rs 1910-1932, 
inclusive, for all crops , food grains, tobacco, and cotton. Again the 
tobacco terms of exchange are highly favorable with the exception of 
the year 1915 when the food grains terms lie above them. It is 
significa.11t that, although the e.ffects of the depression of the late 
20 ' s  and early 30 ' s  can be se'9!1 in the terms for all the commodities 
11u. 8. Department of Agric ulture, Agricultural Statistics, 1949, 
"Index Numbers of Prices Paid by Farmers, 11 Table 672, p. 622. 
12 
and 19.$1. 

























TERMS OF EXCHANGE FOR ALL CROPS, TOBACCO, COTTON, AND 
FOOD GRAINS, 1910-1932� 1910 : 100 
71 
All Crops Tobacco Cotton Food Grains 
100 100 100 100 
93 95 86 85 
9.3 ll6 74 91 
89 13$ 81 79 
86 12 0 69 a, 
82 88 58 104 
88 98 75 94 
JJ.8 140 102 13$ 
16 159 117 ll8 
lo6 17 4 104 109 
107 1.31 106 109 
68 113 53 69 
78 128 81 6J 
86 129 lll 59 
87 U8 llO 67 
90 llJ 90 89 
78 11, 61 80 
76 ll2 66 72 
80 116 76 67 
75 1 4 76 62 
68 98 ,, 51 
.50 70 39 J5 
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under observation, tobacco maintains i ts favorable posi ticn and begi.ns 
a recover/ in 1932 while term.s for other. farm commodities are still 
falling. 
Figure 6 is the graphic presentation of the terms of exchange 
for th.e same co:mmoditi.ea .for the 1933-1950 period. Because tobacco 
was in a more favorable position in 19 33 { its terms of exchange had 
not fallen so sharply and bad begun to recover in 1932 ) ,  one m.ight 
expect the relationsh. p for this period to be le ss tawra.ble .  It, might 
be w.ell to mention again tha t 19.33 was the year in which the Government 
began its p:rograin of aid to agriculture . As ca be seen from casual 
observation of Figure 6, the general agricultural picture as portrayed 
by terns of exchange has been complicated 'by the Govern.rnent programs and 
by the effect of ·�.forld War II on supply and demand in thi.s l atter period. 
The tobacco tems of exchange for the overall period a__� gene·�ally 
favorable. Th , fluctuations in the 19.37-19h1 period insof.l.r as tobacco 
is concerned, can be rela ted almost directly to the farm le g;isla.tion 
and consequent supply and demand forces. With the invalid�tion of the 
Agricultural Adjustment Act, there was a sharp :i.nerease in the 1937 
tobacco erop resulting in an abrupt price decline in 19 38 .  The growers 
rejected the marketing quotas for the 1939 crop, the result being that a 
record crop was produced and priees continued to decline. The 19 40 crop 
was reduced, but the large carry-over prevented large price increa�es 
until 1941 in which year exports began to improve . 'fhe tobacco tenna 




















TERMS OF EXCHANGE FOR ALL CROPS., TOBACCO, COTTON, AND 
FOOD GRAINS, 1933-1950, 1933 =- 100 
74 
All Crops Tobacco Cotton Food Grains 
10 10 0 100 100 
1.30 136 138 12 7 
1.35 lli.7 133 1)6 
144 144 137 155 
15 0 l69 125 164 
110 154 98 108 
112 137 105 10 5 
123 120 1 17 122 
138 133 150 133 
162 185 18,3 14S 
193 22 1 182 166 
198 2.31 178 177 
199 235 183 182 
199 218 2 17 189 
192 182 208 2 13 
170 170 190 182 
15 1 178 173 159 
154 177 19h 160 
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dollar shortage abroad and a consequent decrease in tobacco exports is 
reflected by falling terms of exchange . Tobaeeo staged an early 
recovery from the general agricultural price decline of the late 194o • s. 
Space does not permit the tracing of t.he forces affecting each of the 
colDJilt')di ties • One can judge f:rom Figure 6, however, th at th.e general 
situation of the tobacco fanner in the 1933-195 0 period, as expressed 
by terms of exchange, has not been a particularly gloomy one. 
The 0pr-iees recei vedtt indices published by the Department of' 
Agriculture in annual Agricultural Statistics are concerned with fairly 
general groupings of commodities. For a more detailed analysis, a'\Tailable 
speeifie commodity price indices (fruit, wheat, corn, and milk ) were 
obtained th.rough direct eottespondence with the Bureau of Agricultural 
Economics. These indices use August 190 9-July 1914 as their base 
period, and tems-of -exehange indices were computed by using the 
Department of .Agriculture "prices paid" index to which previous reference 
has been made . Table XI contains data for the 19 10- 1932 period with 
1910 as the base year for the terms-©f-excha."lge indices, and Figure 7 
is a graphic presentation of the t able. Again, the tobacco terms of 
exchange are generally favorable. As has been true in the foregoing 
analy�is, tt.1e food grains ( corn and wheat) occupy a favorable position 
in 191 5. Corn mai11tains its favora:ble terms until 1917 from which year 
there is an abrupt and rapid decline in its position. The highly 

























TERMS OF EXCHANGE FOR TOBACCO, FRUIT, WHEAT, CORN, 
AND MlLK, 1910-19 32, 1910 = 10 0 
Tobacco Fruit Wheat Com 
100 100 10 0 10 0 
95 98 86 90 
116 94 88 108 
1.35 102 77 96 
12 0 82 85 111 
88 74 104 105 
98 75 94 96 
140 74 136 151 
159 90 116 l.36 
174 82 108 12.3 
131 85 10 8 109 
113 68 70 53 
128 94 62 57 
129 74 �8 75 
118 71 65 85 
ll3 90 88 92 
115 77 79 65 
112 77 71 74 
ll6 87 66 8.3 
114 72 61 81 
98 88 50 76 
70 62 34 55 
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the a..�alysis, reflects the tremendous inerease in the demand for 
cigarettes and the switch to domestic blends which was the result of 
the change in tastes during and after World War I .  
79 
Figure 8 is a comparison of the terms of exchange for these 
same products for the 193.3-1950 period; again 193 3 is used as the base 
year for the terms of exchange indices. This is the first analysis 
made in which a commodity other than tobacco occupies a generally 
favorable position as reflected by its terms of exchange. The corn 
terms of exchange are decidedly favorable in the 1934- 1937 period and 
in the 1946-1948 period. Such a position is, in the former ease, a. 
reflection of the supply conditions which resulted f'rom the drought in 
the corn belt in 1934 ano 1936; in the latter case, corn ' s, favorable 
position reflects the tremendous money demand for meat products after 
price controls were removed after World War II. Although this last 
analysis shows that for specific years and as compared with some com­
modities, the tobacco terms of exchange were not as predominantly 
favorable, one still does not g ain the impre9sion that the tobaeeQ 
fanner was suffering unduly from. competitive conditions in his market. 
Cash Income and Fann Value Analyses 
Although it has been previously noted that no one single index 
is an altogether fair measurement of the relative position of farmers, 




















TERMS OF EXCHANGE FOR 1fOBACCO, FRUI'£, WHEAT, CORN, 
AND MILK, 1933-1950, 1933 :  100 
·robaceo Fruit 1'theat Corn 
100 1 0  100 100 
136 ll7 127 155 
147 ll7 136 196 
144 133 1;;5 197 
169 145 16.5 234 
154 10 3 10 8 127 
137 102 10.5 126 
120 109 122 155 
133 120 131 160 
l85 1.38 139 174 
?.21 202 162 208 
2.31 230 174 220 
235 2.30 179 209 
2 18 210 186 240 
182 149 209 26� 
17 0 113 177 247 
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tobacco farmer 1 s crop and on his low income. Figures 9-13 h ave been 
constructed from Tables XIII ... XV II in a..11 effort to determine just what 
the tobacco farmer's relative income position has been. Figures 9 
and 10 are based on cash ineome from crops13 for the period 1910- 1948. 
The comparison is made of cash income from "all crops, " tobaeco, bread 
grains, and cotton a..�d cotton seed. Indices were constructed from the 
raw income data using 191 0 as the base year for Figure 9 and 1933 as 
the base year for Figure 10. There is little necessity for detailed 
narrative . These figures show that in both of' the periods under con­
sideration, the tob acco farmer has enjoyed a steadily increasing cash 
income from his crop and a greater relative increase than that of the 
other commodities being surveyed. The simila.ri ty between these figures 
and figures concerned with tem.s of exchange (Figures 5 and 6, for 
example) indicates that there is a close relationship bet\veen the cash 
income and terms-of-exchange analyses. 
Figures 11, 12, and 1 3  present the "farm valueu of tobacco, 
wheat, and eotton.14 These are drawn to determine the relationships in 
the 18 90- 191 0 period, for which cash income figures are unavailable. 
13u. s. Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the 
United States, 1944, 1 945, 19 50. 
- -
14 
U. s .  Department of Agriculture, Ate:icultural Statistics, 1939; 
U .  s. Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of .the United States, 
192 1, 1926, 19 34, 1940, 195].. "The term ' farm value' uused in the 
various tables means the value of farm products at the local market. tt 
u. s .  Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Statistics, 1 948, p. 2. 
'l\UlLE XIII 
INDEX NUMB.ciRS OF CASH INCOME FROM CROPS, 1910 = 100 
Cotton and 
Total Cotton Seed Tobaeeo Bread Grains 
l�HO 100 lOO 100 100 
19ll 99 .1 97. 2 94. 1 91.1  
1912 10$ . 4  96. 8  105 .8  100 . 7  
1913 104. 9 110 132 • .3 100.9 
1914 98 .9 68 .4 97 13, .8  
191, 111. 2  94. 3 91. 2 155 .2  
1916 137 1.3 0. 4 136.3  169.6  
1917 191.8  182 . 2  236.3  224.l 
1918 236 . 7  202. 8  336.2  )20.6 
1919 260 .1  2,9 . 3  49 0. 2  329 . 4  
1920 �2,.6  167 . 7  289 . 2  290 
1921 142 • .3 96.8 248 180 
1922 1!�6-4  130. 4  244 lL).. l  
1923 165. 6  178 .2  270.6 127 .5 
l9a4 18).6  189 254.9 167 .7  
1925 187. 3 200 254.9 172.6 
1926 16, .7  1.38 . 8  23, 171.3 
1927 174. 8 170.4 241.2  183 . 8  
1928 170 .9 16.5.1  2 42. 2 158 .1 
1929 17J. 7 171. 8 273.5 149 
1930 1) 0. 2  93.6 239 . 2  94. 1 
19Jl 85 .9 56. 4  15.3.9 56.2  
1932 67. 7 52 . 4  u2.7  41.5 
-5 
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INDEX NUMBERS OF CASH INCOME FROM CROPS, 193.3 = 100 
Cotton and 
Total Cotton Seed Tobacco Bread Grains 
l?.3.3 1 0 0 100 100 100 
193a 121.!i 149 .6 1,0 • .3 103 .8 
19.3$ 120. 4 123.4 1,4.1 12.3 .7  
19.36 147 . 6  156.8 154.8  148 
1937 159 .6 15.3 204.4  195.5  
1938 128 .9 u2.1 187 • .3 1)2 
1939 136.l 108. 7 172.6 14 0. 9 
1940 140.4  112.1 154�1 142 .l  
1941 19 0. 7  181.J 204� 4  224. 3 
1942 256 21.4.4  303 . 2  279 .5 
1943 322. 7 227. 7  343. 3 285 . 2  
1944 365. 4  259 .4  4)8. 2  394 
1945 38$. 7 207. 8  571.9 452. s  
1946 451-4 253 • .3 608.3 51Jl. 8  
1947 546 J88 .6 655 -4  821.4 
1948 SliS . 3  h.31.9 621 767 .J 
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INDEX NUMBERS OF FA..ijM VALUE OF OROPS, 1890 = 100 
Tobacco Wheat Cott.on 
1890 100 100 100 
1891 119 150 88 
1892 l)l 102 7$ 
189.3 17 72 71 
1894 99 71 63 
1895 98 13 74 
1896 81 10  11 
1897 101 lJO 100 
1898 108 118 90 
1899 12 1 102 89 
l.900 ill 99 126 
1901 12 4 12-8 91 
1902 128 115 uo 
190) 128 122 140 
1904 12 9 137 164 
1905 149 140 15, 
1905 180 130 173 
1907 17 1 14  1,6 
1908 165 165 162 
1909 206 178 185 
1910 206 151 220 
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';fobacoc Wheat. Ootton 
1910 lOO 100 100 
19U. 60 96 9i 
1912 98 98 101 
191.3 U6 l.@7 107 
1914 ,6 1SS 63 
1915 91 i66 13 
1916 160 11, l.)8 
Ul.1 284 22, 19.3 
1918 380 )Jl 20S 
1.919 f-'9 3U 2,1 
l.!?20 ,11 210 us 
1921. 211 l).3 80 
1922 f7) 1$4 lkl 
1923 284 l.JO 194 
lJ24 21'5 1117 1,0 
l?lS 2)7 169 181 
l926 2J2 176 126 
1,21 237 1a3 162 
1928 2S9 1,60 161. 
l:929 270 150 1,4 
1930 201 U>S 81 
1,;1 12h 61' 60 
1')2 lGl so S2 
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Tobacco Wheat Cotton 
193, 100 100 100 
1934 126 109 89 
193S 134 127 89 
l9)6 1$3 lS7 11, 
1931 171 205 120 
1938 1,1 12'1 77 
1939 160 127 81 
1940 l)l 13$ 94 
1941 187 217 138 
1942 291 260 184 
1943 )20 260 171 
1944 460 )65 191 
19h5 476 405 1$3 
l9k6 $87 ,J7 212 
1?47 Si, 76) 28S 
19&8 536 6J7 )4l 
1910 JOB 5-22 347 
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They also offer a further check on the c1:tSh income analyses. The years 
1890, 1910, and 19 33 were used as base periods for the computation of 
indices . Figure 11, which is concerned with the 1890-1910 period, shows 
that the farm value of all commocti. ties under consideration was subject, 
to extreme fluctuation . After 1896 the trend is decidedly upward for 
tobaeco and the flue-t:,uation.s seem to have been controlled to sollle extent. 
Figure 11 i.s a surprising visual aid to the concept of a managed market 
which is presumed to have existed during the years of the '.l:obacco Trust. 
Figures 12 and 13 a.re quite comparable to figures 9 and 10. A similar 
relatiol'lship among commodities as to farm value and cash income is 
.readily observable . 
While there are shortcom.i.ngs in the analyses concerned with cash 
income and farm value (we have not concernecl. ourselves with the relative 
costs of production, acreage and yield figures ,  etc . ) ,  again it must be 
concluded that arguments as to the tobacco farmer ' s  low income are 
probably not valid. The truth seems to be tba t, while tobacco income 
stood . up well, income from other farm products on which the tobacco 
fa.mer was partially dependent fell off so that J:'l..is lot was indeed sorry. 
Here, however, we b egin to concern ourselves with the institutional 
pattern of tob acco farming which may best be reserved for later dis­
cussion. It need only be said here that the income and fann value 
analyses as ·well as the terms-of-exchange analyses le ad one to doubt 
seriously the validity of partial equilibrium analysis in dealing �"Ii.th 
the problem. of the tobacco farmer • s wellbeing. 
CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Summary 
The study of market types and of their economic and social 
consequences has been the subject 0£ detailed inqu:i.ry in the past; 
the study of particular industries within market types appears to offer 
a more fruitful field for research at the present time . The tobacco 
industry was chosen as the subjeet for this research because of the 
writer ' s  personal interest and because preliminary investigation re­
vealed that those -who have studied the industry had been the ,rietims 
of delusions acquired as a consequence of misapplications 0£ static 
price theory. The tools for measurement in the social sciences are 
being eonstantly discovered, revised, and refined over time; this study 
relies on such a t-0011 the terms -of-exchange index. 
In this thesis the tobacco industry has been investigated from 
both an historical and a theoretical standpoint. The industry was 
traced from 1890 to 1 95 0. ·rhe history divided itself into three 
periods; 1890-1911, the years of the Tobacco Trust; 191•19 32, the 
years in which there was "free enterpriseu in the industry, in the 
sense that the tobacco grower was free to produce and sell as he 
pleased and the tobacco companies were also free to buy and sell as 
they pleased, subject only to accepted anti-trust regulations; and 
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1933-1950, the years of Government intervention and aid to the tobacco 
grower in the form of production control and price -support programs. 
Each of these periods was discussed in detail. It was concluded that 
during the first period the tobaeeo grower was subjected to harsh 
treatment from whieh he has yet to recover mentally; in the grower 's  
mind he is  still the unwilling victim of the wiles of the 11Big Three, "  
the American Tobacco Company, R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, and 
Liggett and Myers Tobacco Company. 
It was seen that there is vast concentration on both the buying 
and selling side in the tobacco industry. Over the years some three or 
four tobacco companies have purchased about sixty per cent of the 
domestic tobacco crop and distributed about eighty per cent of the 
tobacco products sold in the United States. The tobacco industry is, 
indeed, a fair characterization of the market type known as "oligopoly­
oligopsonyt1 in which a few firms deal with many sellers on the one hand 
and buyers on the other and are able to aft ect the prices of the raw 
materials which they buy and the finished product whioh they sell. 
They are thus able to influence their rivals ' policies who in turn 
influence theirs; such a eondition is called "circular interd.ependence. 11 
The difficulty of decision-making under such circumstances was pointed 
out, and it was explained prices and output might vary between the limits 
of pure competition and pure monopoly. 
An attempt to measure phenomena is often frustrated by the 
inability to obtain data. This was found to b e  true in the ease under 
consideration. One quantity to be sought was that of the amount of 
exploitation to which the tobacco grower has been subjeeted. Upon exa.m­
ination o! the theory of exploitation, it was seen that such measurement 
would require cost figures of both tobacco growers and tobacco eompan.ies, 
neither of which are available. Tobaeeo growers have always contended 
that they were worse off economically than other farmers and have 
asserted that the reason for their plight has lain in the exploitation 
by the tobacco compa�.ies. Academic people -historiane and economists 
alike-have supported the position of the growers . If it. is impossible 
to measure the exploitation� th-:n perhaps it is possible to measure 
relative economic positions . The problem beeomes one, then, of devising 
so.me method of measuring the tobacco grower ' s  comparative economic 
position. Buch a method was found in the terms-of-ex.change index formu­
lated by Theodore Schultz and the "Ames School . "  
In reality, even if' expleitation could be measured, there would 
be mueh left to be ascertained as to the tobaeeo grower's status . Well­
being is a Pelative matter, and in this sense the terms-cf-exchange 
measurement is ideal because it makes the comparison in tenns of the 
relationship between the prices farmers have received for their product 
and the prioes they have paid for the things they buy. To be sure, 
the term.s-o.f ... exchange analyds has its limitations. It deals with 
aggregates, so that separate forces (yields, mechanization, specific 
cost.s of production, ate. ) are not taken into consideration except insofar 
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as their influences tend to counter-balance each other in the "prices 
paidn index. The tel'llls -of -exchange concept can 'be defended more 
readily, perhaps, when it is used to compare agriculture and industry 
as a. whole; this was Schultz ' s  original use of "tl'le concept . But pre­
cisely the same indices are used in the formulation of "parity-" prices 
for agricultural commodities as were used in the compu·tation of certain 
of the tams-of-exchange indices given in Chapter IV. The writer had 
no choice but to make use of the concepts and data furnished by the 
Bureau oi.' gricultural Ecooomios, u. s .  Department of Agriculture, even 
·though it ha.a meant using a "prices paid0 index hich was taken to be  
the same for both tobacco farmers and, s�, wheat farmers. It is 
significant, however, hat the outcome v1a.s the same whether tobacco 
was compared • i th cotton, a southern crop produced with large amounts 
of manual lab or or with vilheat, produced in the Midwest under highly 
mechani.z d conditions . Again, the terms-of-exchange analysis may be 
questioned because of the necessity of the arbitrary selection of some 
year as a base period for the formulation of price indices and terlllS­
of-exchange indices. Such doubt has wide implications, for it casts a 
shadow upon innumerable statistical studies made in the past. Yet 
henever the static analysis of the neo-olassical theory ra·1s, o ther 
approaches, though imp rfect, must be  tried. A tezms-of-exchange 
az alysis -was made, with full recognition of its limitations, for the 
purpose of discovering the relative well-being of the tobacco grower. 
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The analysis was made on the basis of the historical periods into 
rhich the tobacco industry seemed to divide itself. The years 189 0, 
191 0, and 193 3 were used as the base years for the compilation of the 
te?'llls-of-exchange indices. There was little difficulty involved in 
obtaining 11priees received11 indices. These cou.ld be computed, when 
necessary, from raw agricultural price s-ries. he problem lay in t.he 
procurement of "prices paid11 indices, which are not readily available. 
The terms-of-exchange indices �.Jere formulated on the basis of price 
indices using 1910- 19 14, 1913, and 1926 as bass years; the writer thus 
took advantage of the available "prices paid" · ndices for the sake of 
comparison. It was found that only minute differences resulted from a 
change in ·the base period of the price indices . 
Terms-of-exehange . indices v,ere computed for "all crops, 11 tobacco, 
wheat, cotton, food grains, corn, milk, and fruit . The study was limited 
by the difficulty of obtaining price data and by the excessive amount of 
time required to tra."'lslate the raw data into indic�s . All possibilities 
were not exhaustede Cotton and wheat figured prominently in the com­
parative analysis because they are primary examples of agricultural 
com.�odities which are considered to be sold under nearly purely competi­
tive conditions. '!'hey differ in the extent to which there has occurred 
increased efficiency in their production as a result of mechanization 
a.."ld because of institutional factors . Because the meat industry is of 
the "oligopsony-oligopolyn type, it wo uld be of interest to carry this 
study a step further and compare the terms of exchange for animal 
products with those of tobacco. Such a step well might strengthen the 
validity of the terms -of-exchange analysis in dealing with specific 
p roducers I well b eing. 
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To summarize briefly the results of the terms-of-exchange analysis 
as applied here, the following relationships may be  presented. 
1. In the 1890- 1910 period, tobacco terms of exchange were 
generally unfavorable , though they were even then more favorable than 
those of wheat. � priori., we should expect this on a number of grounds. 
The evidence of contemporary observers strongly supports the assertion 
that the powerful monopoly was an equally powerful monopsony and that a 
merciless exploitation did occur. The exploitation was not offset by 
efforts on the part of the monopoly, particularly through 0modern11 adver­
tising campaigns, to affect the demand function for tobacco products. 
Too, cigars ,vere relatively more important as a manufactured product in 
those days and they were sold in a highly competitive market. 
2 .  In the 1910-1932 period tobacco terms o f  exchange were highly 
favorable as compared with those of other commodities. The graphic pre­
sentation of these data shows that only in the instance of the bread 
grains during a three -year period of World War I did the terms of exchange 
for any commodity· studied lie above those of tobacco. 
J .  In the 19 32 -1952 period tob acco terms o f  exchange were gener­
.ally favorable, though their relatively good position was not as pronounced 
as in the immediately preceding period. The general impression from the 
analysis, however, was that tobacco grmirers were not suffering. 
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A further attempt was made to assay tbe tobacco grower ts relative 
position through a comparison of the ca.sh income from "all crops,, " 
cotton and cotton seed, tobacco., and bread grains and through com­
parison of the farm value of tobacco, Wheat, and cotton over time. The 
limitations of such an analysis were set forth. The resulting figures 
showed much the same position for the tobacco grower as did the te:rms­
of -exchange analysis. 
Conclusions 
The temptation to make too many generalizations as the result 
of such a studJ' as this seems to be one that many writers have been 
unable to resist. Conclusions which are too strong or too sweeping can 
only add to the confusion whieh is already abundant in the area vr.ith 
which this particular study is concerned. Unfortunately, the eonf'usion 
exists both in the literature concerned with economic theory and in the 
literature concerned with the history of the tob acco industry. 
The purpose of this study was to  discover the truth concerning 
the relative well-being of tob acco farmers insofar a.s that well -being 
has been dependent upon the production of a specific cOlll!Il.odity, tobacco. 
The conclusion reached may be stated quite simply: the tobacco grower 
has been in a relatively favorable position since 1911 as measured by 
his terms of exchange and as compared with the growers of previously 
specified commodities. The arguments for and against the terms of 
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exchange as a measuring device have been stated. No conclusion has bean 
reached as to whether or not the tobacco grower has, sinoe 1911, - been 
subjected to exploi tat· on. 'l'heoretical analysis shows that he may well 
have been, but this is not the point under discussion. No conclusion 
has been reached as to whether or not tobacco companies have eolluded 
to force the price of tobacco b elow that which ould result under a purely 
competitive ai tuatioa. The evidence of explicit eollusion are singularly 
unimpressive, but this is not the point under discussion. The terms-of­
excha.nge analysis ha.s shown convincingly that the tobacco grower has been 
and is, with or without exploitation, in a relatively favorable position 
insofar as his prices and their exchange value for the products he buys 
are eoneerned. If the tobacco grower feels that he has suffered to a 
greater extent than other farmers in agricultural recessions,  the causes 
of this suffering must be looked for in factors which are beyond the 
control of tobacco companies. Some of the possibilities have been 
touched on briefly in  preceding discussion, but while there is  ample 
room for speculation, this subject is again b eyond the scope of this 
paper . 
Be0ause the tobaeeo grower has been in a relatively f avora.ble 
position, the inference might be made that the. oligopo-ly-oligopeony 
market situation is a favorable one for the seller of an agricultural 
product. However, each industry must be studied in the light of its 
own peculiarities, and this is certainly true in the ease of an industry 
which is classified as being of the oligopoly -oligopsony type . '.l.'he 
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market situation is one of diverse uncertainties and potentialities ;  
th.�re is a. certain understandable reluctance to  make inferences - so at 
odds with the usu.al ones . 
A question has been asked; it has been an�nered. et a person 
of norm.al curiosity can hardly fail to ask the next question. Why? 
'fuy do ·!;.he implications of static analysis not appear to be borne out? 
'1tly has the tobacco gl"Ower benefited from eondi tions which one would 
have expected to be harmful to him? Wh.y is his position; as measured 
by the terms of exchange, remarkably more favorable than tha't of the 
eotton gro��r who has received a price for his product determined 1n a 
purely competitive market and ho is subject to the vicissitudes of 
southern agriculture and the lack of mechanization to much the same 
extent that the tobaeco grower is? These and otheF questions come 
readily to mind. The answer must lie in the peculiar conditions under 
which the buyer of the raw material sells his finished product. The 
contJ;>ol whl,.ch the tobacco companies exert over the sale of their product 
apparently redounds to the benefit of the tobacco grower. Because these --­
few firms are able to affect the shape and position of the demand curve 
for tobacco products and because they are able to achie-ve efficient 
scales, the long -run benefits of securing a certain., dependable quantity 
of raw material far outweigh the questionable gains to be had from a 
persistent and harsh depression of tobacco priees. 
Th e nature of the tobacco industry as concerns the manu facturing 
and distribution process is such that it precludes competition from men 
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"with a few hundred dollar,s1t and "ingenuity and zeal and energy-. 11 Thus 
the major tobacco co, pani es have rarely been concerned about the entry 
f new firms into t,he indu5try. And that scale benefits a.re substantial 
can be a matter of little doubt.  
The chief reason, however, for the relatively favorable position 
of the tobacco gro·war seems to lie in the fact that he is in the com­
fortable position of having a few firms, which make e-wiry effort to 
differentiate their manufactured produets, do his advertising for him. 
This is .especially important vmen we reflect that the income elasticity 
of demand for tobacco products is very low.1 For this means that the 
consumption of tobacco products would not rise rapidly in times of ex­
panding national ineome . (Contrariwise, of col.U'se, a low income 
elastioi ty of demand would be a protection in times of dep:ression and 
falling national income. ) Since the price elasticity of demand for 
tobacco,  like that of many farm commodities,  is likewise low, the 
tobacco manufacturing firms have concentrated their efforts to improve 
their demand position, one against the other, by heavy advertising 
campaigns . These have been exceeded in the gaudiness of their eoncep­
tion only by their extreme wlgari ty. 2 
1
See Tennant, �· ill•, especially PP• 119- 126 . 
2 
F'or figures on selling costs in the cigarette industry, which are 
relatively very high, see Warren C.  'aite and Ralph Cassady, !h!_ Consumer 
and the Economic Order ( 2d ed. ; New York 1 eOraw-Hill, 1949 ) ,  P•  176. ,....,.,,....., _ . . 
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They have bee. , neV1 rtheless, indisput,ably effecti ve . They have 
given an upward thrust to th demand curves for most tobacco product,s, 
but especially for cigarettes, which has been phenomenal. The result 
has been that tobacco growers have prospered �ong with the tobacco 
companies .. There is more truth than jest in the comment t.hat it is fa.r 
better to b e  an exploited tobacco farmer than an unexploited cotton 
farmer. That this eonclusion should offend one ' s  sense of justice is 
scarcely less likely than that the major conclusion of this paper will 
please tobacco growers. Economists must long s ince have learne , how­
ever, that popularity ia certainly not one of the rewards of the 
profession. 
A battle has been raging in the arena of the social sciences for 
many years . On one side are those who believe that the ultimate goal 
of science is  the discovery of truth, that science is measurement, that 
th€ chief value of the social scientist lies in his ability, given 
assumptions, to predict; on the other side are those who believe that 
·science is creativity and that the social scientist must do far more 
than seek immutable laws . Somewhere, almost lost in the sound and fury 
of the battle, are a legion of men who, with a dispassionate view, see 
merl t in the arguments of each side and who ,vork quietly to find a 
eompromise or a common meeting-ground miere the two forces may join sides 
in the greater struggle for the preservation . of posterity. 
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In the several fields of the social sciences, the battle lines 
have b�come more sharply drawn. In economics the struggle 1as long 
b,etween those 'Who debated the merits of "deduct,i ve" versus 0induetive 11 
studies. From the time of the incomparable Jevons economis�s have come 
more and more to r ecognize the futility of such argument, and much 
progress has been made in the direction of an appropriate joining of 
"theory" and "measurement." As has been generally true in all the social 
seit:mces, the development of economics as a science has been the result 
of the interaction of theory and measurement. Theory sets out proposi­
tions which generalize scattered ob servations and �hen proceeds to 
deduce th e logical consequences of these propo itions . a.surement 
provides a basis for refining or modifying and, in some instances, re­
futing theory. It is only when theory and measurement work together 
that the discovery process, 'Which is science, is logically followed by 
creativity, which is science; it is only then that the social sciences 
and th e social scientists .fulfill their obligations to society. In a 
world of uncertainty, this is certainty. 
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TOBACCO '." TWENTY YEARS OF PROGRESS 
Growers Use Federal Farm Programs to Achieve 
· Balanced Production and Fair Prices 
$apply • Productloa 
DitappcalllCC !I f1r111m• Price 'J 
(biltlOftl of pouacl,)------------------------------- (cents per pound) 
� Supplyll 
• ProcL.ctloa JI 
!lill Dlupi,e1,.nce lJ 
-4 • F1rmera' Price !1 -------------m 
3 
t 
�-�--�- - - - - -
1 Carry-over from previous crop year plus current crop. 
3 Total production for current crop year. 
" '.fotal supply minus �\O<;ks at _end of crop year. 
• Season average farm price per _poun� . 
. • Crop year begins July _1 Qf )he calendar_ year in which the crop is harveste4 for Bue-cured, 
_Connecticut Valley shade-:grqwn, and ,Georgia-Florida shade-grown ; �JI other types', October 1. 
· -. All · domesti_c ·types. 
· · · ' · - · •·· · 
• P_reliminary. 
1920-28 Supplies and prices flui:tuate widely. Gains in good years more than wiped out in poor ones. Small · 1927 crop .brings relatively good price but larger 1928 crop starts price decline. 
1929-32 
193}-35 
Record 1929 and 1930 crop_s e:reate tr�mepdous surplus, driving prkes to fowest point since before World War I. Near-i:ecord 1931 crop causes market collapse, bankrupting thousands of growers. 
Congr�s passes _Agtjcultur�I Adjustment Act of _1933. Complying with p�od_ucti_Q!} adj_u�tme.�t co_n_t_rac�s,' _growers make su�stantial J>.rogress t?ward ehmmatmg pnce-depress1Iig surpluses. Improved supply-demand ratl0 and stabilizing and price-supporting effect of marketing agreements ·bring farm pr�� ipcrea�. By 1_935, farm _income from .tobacco aRp_roximates .P.re-'depr�sion level. •. .. ' . . . -. • .• . . 
. .  �" . .... . � . 
, .  - . · ... . . 
1936-37 Agricultural · ·  Adjus_tmI\nt Act of.' .. _1933, · invalidate� -by · ·Supreme · Coutt . decision, _replaced with _ _  So_il Conservatiiiri . and J?omestic · Allotmeri( ,Act. 

















Gr�wers reject quotas for 1939 ·ciop. ·Re�ofd .;ield- :fro� largest acreag�-since 1930 results in :record crop. War starts in Europe. Bloc�
?-
de. virtually· ·  halts shipping and most . importers, wi_thdrliw from . market. ·£rices tu_mbk to _lowest point since_ 1933. Congress changes act to ba�e farm marketing quotas on acreage allotmeµts.- Growers approve qu.otits overwhelmingly for 1940 crop of flu��cured arid" burley. ccc· arrange·s to 'i.-estoi't t9 m�rket, equivalent purchasing power -of major European buyers, th_us preventing complete ·marker· collapse, . . . . ' . . . . . . . : 
; 
� · ·" ·.. ,j' .;f ; . -Crop· reduced sharply from 1939, but ·supplies continue to_ exceed demand because of further drop in exp·orts and large carry-over from 1939 crop . 
. , .  . . . ;. Dqmestic consumption, part,ic_ula1:Jy of cigarettes, increases ._sharply and exports also improve. In May 1941, Co_ngress authorizes h>�n. ;md,purchase prngram to support price to coop.erat�ng prpdueers at• 85 per�ut of parity. Loan iate increased to 9.0 percent of parity in, l942.: Surpluses disappear as demand exceeds production. Farm prices shoot upward and are. well above parity for all kinds in 1943-45. Burley and flue-cured quotas are continued in order to prevent overexpansion at expense of "war crops:' ; 
.- .are adjusted as_ necessary t9 _meet requirefll_ents. Fire-cured.and dark..�fr--. cured .quotas . suspende_d _from,1943 tq .-1945. _ · :- -· . 
Quotas adjusted to .fit new paUern of requ_i_rem�nts as.exports n;ach po�tw�r - , peak. Production of all types - is highest of recoi;� arid consumption and farm price also �it n�w highs. · · · · 
- ..i . - ;- . 
Ex
p.
orts- · decline · sliarply owing to dollar shortage abroad. Reduction in 1941 crop is more tb,an ·offset by- large carry-over from 1946 crop . 
.,, . �  . 
Quotas reduced sharply from 1947 levels 'to prevent new build-up of surpluses. Exports increase 15 percent largely because of ECA program. 
·Exports. somewha� above 1_948. D��estic cigarette -eonsu�ption ,continues _ upward -trend, with result�ng strong ma_r_ket for flue-�ured, - burley, and Maryland types. Quota, a�1ustments allow· larger plantings. of flue-cured and burley, smaller plantings of da�k tobaccos. Production of all types !bout 2 fercent below 1948. _Despite smaller total crop, total supply mcr_$lases largely- h_ecause �f mcreas�d production .of cigar leaf and decreased conf��ption �f cigar leaf �n? _ .s�me dark tobaccos. Virginia sun-cured ,quotas proclaimed for first time and voted by growers for 1950-�2 cr�ps. · � · 
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